MEMORYLANDS

Heritage and identity in Europe today

Sharon Macdonald

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ROUTLEDGE

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Memorylands is an original and fascinating investigation of the nature of heritage, memory and understandings of the past in Europe today. It looks at how Europe has become a 'memoryland' – littered with material reminders of the past, such as museums, heritage sites and memorials; and at how this 'memory phenomenon' is related to the changing nature of identities – especially European, national and cosmopolitan. In doing so, it provides new insights into how memory and the past are being performed and reconfigured in Europe – and with what effects.

Drawing especially, though not exclusively, on cases, concepts and arguments from social and cultural anthropology, *Memorylands* argues for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the cultural assumptions involved in relating to the past. It theorizes the various ways in which materializations of identity work and relates these to different forms of identification within Europe. The book also addresses questions of methodology, including discussion of historical, ethnographic, interdisciplinary and innovative methods. Through a wide range of case-studies from across Europe, Sharon Macdonald argues that Europe is home to a much greater range of ways of making the past present than is usually realized – and a greater range of forms of historical consciousness. At the same time, however, she seeks to highlight what she calls 'the European memory complex' – a repertoire of prevalent patterns in forms of recollection and 'past presencing'.

The examples in *Memorylands* are drawn from both the margins and metropolitan centres, from the relatively small-scale and local, the national and the avant-garde. The book looks at pasts that are potentially identity-disrupting – or 'difficult' – as well as those that affirm identities or offer possibilities for transcending national identities or articulating more cosmopolitan futures. Topics covered include authenticity, temporalities, embodiment, commodification, nostalgia and *Ostalgie,* the musealization of everyday and folk-life, Holocaust commemoration and tourism, narratives of war, the heritage of Islam, transnationalism, and the future of the past.

Memorylands is engagingly written and accessible to general readers as well as offering a new synthesis for advanced researchers in memory and heritage studies. It is essential reading for those interested in identities, memory, material culture, Europe, tourism and heritage.

Sharon Macdonald is Anniversary Professor of Cultural Anthropology at the University of York, UK and Visiting Professor in the Institute of European Ethnology, Humboldt University, Berlin. Her authored books include *Difficult Heritage* (Routledge, 2008) and *Reimagining Culture,* and, as editor, *The Politics of Display* (Routledge, 1997) and *The Companion to Museum Studies* (Choice Outstanding Academic Title, 2007).

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For Tara
Once upon a time…

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has taken longer than intended due to a surfeit of memory – and forgetting. It has been a journey through a memoryland of my own research and that of others. En route, I kept remembering other things that I wanted to add – and at the same time I recalled that there were other changes and additions that I had once intended to make but had now forgotten just what they were. Materialised memories on scraps of paper or Word files – and physical acts such as scratching my head – sometimes helped. But I am nevertheless left keenly aware that the finished book is a product of forgetting as well as recollection.

Because of this book's own long and multi-sited history – in several research projects and numerous papers given in various versions – there are many who have helped along the way, more than I can list here. Those who were thanked in earlier texts on which this book draws must count those thanks as extending to this one too. The following, however, need to be named here as they have variously and generously provided comments and further references – as friends, colleagues and referees who revealed their identities – on the proposals for this book and the new and revised text: Simone Abram, Tara Beaney, Thomas Beaney, Victoria Kendzia Bishop, Mads Daugbjerg, Steffi de Jong, Gordon Fyfe, Anselma Gallinat, Sarah Green, Peter György, Steve Hoelscher, Angela Janelli, Stef Jansen, Siân Jones, Petra Tjitske Kalshoven, Erica Lehrer, Peggy Levitt, Jan Lorenz, Nilesh Mistry, Jennie Morgan, Jane Nadel-Klein, David Lowenthal, Jörn Rüsen, Markus Tauschek, Claske Vos, Hannah Wadle, and Gisela Welz. In addition, the following, as well as some of the former, have also helped me with specific queries, references and images: Kerstin Barndt, Isabelle Benôit, Jeanette Edwards, Alexa Färber, Jackie Feldman, Paola Filippucci, Alyssa Grossman, Anat Hecht, Michael Herzfeld, Andrew Irving, Neringa Klumbyte, Ulrich Kockel, Donald Mac Donald, Jonathan Macdonald, Peter McIsaac, Chris Rumford,

Janet Simmonds, Dan Stone, Thomas Thiemeyer and John Widdowson. Harriet Beaney found me some great quotes and gave encouragement and tea when my energy flagged. The Department of Social Anthropology at Manchester University, where I worked during the writing of this book, and the Institute of European Ethnology at the Humboldt University, Berlin, where I hold a visiting professorship, provided a wonderful mix of stimulating colleagues, whose work and intellectual engagement indelibly shape what follows. At Routledge, Amy Davis-Poynter has kept up the vital work of reminding me of deadlines – and extending them to cope with my inability to stop tampering. It is Mike Beaney, though, who has most journeyed European memorylands with me, reminding me to keep going, reading my text, challenging my interpretations, and telling me what to remember – and forget.

Although *Memorylands* was originally conceived as more or less a collection of earlier articles, it has not ended up that way. Some chapters do draw on some of my previously published writing, but just as recollecting involves reshaping, reconceiving and making new connections, rather than just reproducing, so, too, any original material has been extensively chopped up, rewritten and supplemented with new additions or different interpretations. Many chapters include research of my own that I have not previously published. The following is a list of articles that have been plumbed – in a few cases fairly substantially and in others for shorter passages. I thank all those involved in the original pieces – as editors, reviewers and other interlocutors – for their help at that stage in this continuing journey; and the publishers or other copyright holders for permission to draw from them here.

'A people's story? Heritage, identity and authenticity' in C. Rojek and J. Urry (eds) *Touring Cultures. Transformations of Travel and Theory*, London/New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 155–75.
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PROLOGUE

The cover image shows the new monument to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution shortly after its unveiling in Budapest in October 2006. Composed of durable steel bars and on a monumental scale, memorialisation is also performed here through the ephemerality and delicacy of flowers laid by members of the public. One of numerous new memorials to diverse pasts that have come to populate Europe during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the monument is redolent of many themes and ambivalences in Europe's memorylands.

Fifty years after the event, the monument commemorates Hungary's short-lived revolt against Soviet control, and calls for remembrance of lives lost by participants who were hanged for their role in the uprising. Initiated by Hungary's governing Socialist party, the monument is ostensibly a statement of national unity in shared mourning for those whose lives were lost or blighted by the Communist regime. It can also be seen as a proclamation of Hungary's national independence. Yet it was fiercely opposed by some groups within the nation, including some 1956 organisations, comprised partly of those who fought the Communists and survived (sometimes suffering years of imprisonment). Their general mistrust of the government was coupled with dissatisfaction with the abstraction of the monument. The steel pillars from which it is made, they argued, did not so much resemble human figures (as the artists – the i-Ypszilon Group – claimed) as gallows. As such, it was a reminder of abjection rather than heroism or solidarity. Following their protests, the government finally awarded these organisations funds to create a different 1956 memorial of their own. This, by contrast, is an uplifting allegorical design of human figures in forwards and upwards momentum.

The design of the national memorial is also ambiguous in other ways, as Péter György points out. The monument is comprised of numerous steel

FIGURE 0.1 The national 1956 memorial, showing the pillar design. Photograph courtesy of Péter György and Mária Nemény i

FIGURE 0.2 Alternative 1956 monument: Buda memorial, sculpted by Róbert Csikzentmihály. Photograph courtesy of Péter György and Mária Nemény i

pillars, shaped into a wedge, spread out and rusted at one end and coming together into a tightly packed and shiny surfaced wall at the other. As he writes: 'The architectural metaphor is almost alarmingly clear: the abstract pieces in fact stand for the ever denser crowd of demonstrators' (2008: 134). Where the pillars are spread out, it is possible for visitors to walk amongst them, so allowing them to become part of the crowd. Yet, curiously, as they move further in it becomes impossible to proceed, so creating an experience of being *ejected* by the memorial and forced to walk around it (2008: 134). The visitor, then, is tempted into

history, into being part of the collective, and then expelled and turned into an onlooker rather than participant. Or perhaps – reflecting upon her blurred reflection and that of those around her in the shiny wall of the monument – she becomes a participant in a new form of memory practice, gazing not just onto the past but onto her own act of commemoration.

Then there is the question of place. The location of the monument – in Felvonulási Square – is undoubtedly historically resonant. It was here that a statue of Stalin, on an enormous pedestal, was toppled in the uprising on 23 October 1956, leaving only his boots still standing. (In an interesting translocation, a replica of those boots is now displayed in that curious meta-monument to the end of Socialism, the Budapest Statue Park of Communist Sculpture.) In addition, the Square also housed a statue of Lenin and a giant cross. Yet, György argues, there is no longer any trace of these, so rendering them 'inaccessible to all those who only have a vague notion of the events or not even that' (2008: 130). Rather than acting *with* what he calls 'the spirit of place' to enhance traces that could act as spurs to recollection, the monument takes an abstract and predominantly 'literary narrative' form that fails to engage with its own location and activate public memory in a more emplaced and meaningful fashion.

Yet, despite these 'failures', this new, abstract monument has become a site for that widespread, popular – traditional but also increasing – memorial practice of laying flowers. As we see in the cover image, these more fleeting and small-scale forms of remembrance are abundant. They are instances of numerous, and diverse, commemorative practices and contemporary marking of the past that also populate Europe's memorylands.

1

THE EUROPEAN MEMORY COMPLEX

Introduction

> The imperative of our epoch is ... to keep everything, to preserve every indicator of memory.
>
> Pierre Nora[1]

Memory has become a major preoccupation – in Europe and beyond – in the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Long memories have been implicated in justifications for conflicts and calls for apologies for past wrongs. Alongside widespread public agonising over 'cultural amnesia' – fears that we are losing our foothold in the past, that 'eye-witnesses' of key events are disappearing, and that inter-generational memory transition is on the wane – there has been a corresponding efflorescence of public (and much private) memory work. Europe has become a memoryland – obsessed with the disappearance of collective memory and its preservation. Europe's land- and city-scapes have filled up with the products of collective memory work – heritage sites, memorials, museums, plaques and art installations designed to remind us of histories that might otherwise be lost. More and more people live or work in or visit sites of memory; and increasing numbers are engaged in quests to save or recuperate fading or near-forgotten pasts. Local history societies, re-enactment groups and volunteer-run heritage projects flourish. Books of reminiscences and sepia photos of localities and community cram the shelves of libraries and bookstores. So too, do books about our fixation with remembering and the past.

This book is, inevitably, an addition to the memory mountain; or, more specifically, to that part of it concerned with trying to understand the memory preoccupation itself. Its particular contribution is anthropological, and more specifically still it provides a perspective from anthropological research on

Europe. Central to an anthropological perspective is the attempt to understand assumptions made by people when they organise their worlds in the ways that they do. What is taken for granted when people feel compelled to act in certain ways? What assumptions inform senses of what is important? How are feelings bound up with particular as well as with more shared experiences? Are there alternative ways of seeing, doing and feeling – perhaps to be found among peoples in other parts of the world or in the less examined parts of Europe itself – that can unsettle our assumption that things must be done or felt in the ways that are more widespread or habitual?

This book was written out of a conviction that anthropological research on Europe contains much that can probe and unsettle ways in which memory, and especially the ongoing memory and heritage boom, are typically addressed and theorised. In part this stemmed from realising that my own research on a variety of topics in various parts of Europe threw up unexpected similarities or convergences. Investigating these further was another spur to write this book. So too was a degree of frustration that although there is so much excellent ethnographic research done on Europe, studies are less often brought together and synthesised than they might be – and I include my own here. As such, anthropological research often contributes less to wider debates than it could – or, in my view, should. In part, this is probably due to anthropologists' emphasis on the importance of context and the local, and insistence on recognising complexity, which makes us more wary of the kinds of generalisations that other disciplines are more ready to make. While this is in itself admirable, it can sometimes mean that ethnographers do not realise some of the broader implications of their work or what it shares with that of others. It also makes it hard for those from other disciplines to relate ethnographic research to their own; and this is compounded by the fact that ethnographic texts often require more careful and time-consuming reading. How to recognise the complexities and specificities that ethnographic research typically highlights and at the same time to identify broader patterns is the challenge. This book is the result of daring to take up this gauntlet.

In doing so, then, it attempts to meet two aspirations that might be seen as contradictory or at least as in tension – but that I regard as crucial to our improved understanding of Europe as a memoryland – or set of memorylands. The indeterminacy of the singular or plural here is indicative of what is at issue. On the one hand, my aim in this book is to identify patterns in ways of approaching and experiencing the past that are widely shared across Europe. My argument is that there is a distinctive – though not exclusive or all-encompassing – complex of ways of doing and experiencing the past within Europe. This is not some kind of static template – a cultural blueprint or the like. Rather, it is a repertoire of (sometimes contradictory) tendencies and developments. The European memoryland, I contend, is characterised more by certain changes underway, and also by particular tensions and ambivalences, than by enduring memorial forms. This is not to say that there are no relatively longstanding patterns within

Europe – there are. But they are not necessarily the most significant in the lives of European peoples. Rather than give them analytical priority just on account of their ancestry and age, my concern is to explore how they play out in relation to other parts of the memory complex.

On the other hand, I seek to show that there are also significant variations within Europe. This diversity is not only of the kind that is so often used as part of depictions of European plurality. In other words, it is not just about the 'multicultural colour' or 'local flavours' provided by, say, heritage foodstuffs or different forms that memorial practices might take. It also concerns less evident but potentially ramifying matters such as whether significance is attached to collective remembering at all, whether longer or shorter time periods are activated in local commemorative life or how personal and collective memories are brought together. This diversity is why the plural 'memorylands' is appropriate. Some of this diversity exists at fairly micro, localised – perhaps village or street – levels; but in other cases it carves up Europe along lines relating to particular histories, such as certain patterns of nostalgia in post-Socialist countries or attempts to devise 'transcultural heritage' in cities which have experienced post-colonial immigration – though even here there are more localised variations.

Recognising diversity is important for a number of reasons, not least for allowing the empirical to inform analytical understanding. Variations can act as a foil to help to highlight more common practices and assumptions, and can irritate our theorising to lead it in new, less predictable, directions. Alternatives may be brought to light when they come into conflict with majority patterns or when misunderstandings rooted in difference ensue; and, as such, recognising them – and finding better means of doing so – can also provide a basis for improved understanding of conflicts and misunderstandings. Moreover, awareness of 'cultural alternatives' can not only unsettle assumptions but can also open up new possibilities by highlighting other routes – other ways of doing memory, heritage and identity – that we might choose to take.

The memory phenomenon

The more specific focus of this book is what has variously been called 'memory fever', 'memory mania', an 'obsession with memory', 'the memory craze', a 'remembrance epidemic', 'commemorative fever', 'the memory crisis', 'the memory industry', 'the memory boom', and a time of 'archive fever' and 'commemorative excess'.[2] Aspects of it have also been characterised as a 'heritage industry', 'heritage craze' or 'heritage crusade'.[3] These terms have been coined to characterise an increase in public attention to the past, especially its commemoration and preservation. While prefigured earlier in various ways, this increase is usually dated as gathering pace from the 1970s and escalating further towards the end of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.[4] It includes phenomena such as those sketched in the first paragraph of this book above, and

others including the creation of new civic rituals to commemorate (sometimes long-) past events, arguments over which histories should be aired in the public sphere and how, popular genealogy, the creation of heritage products, such as traditional foods and the broadcasting of numerous different television programmes about the past ranging from series about archaeology, with names such as *Time Team,* to historical dramas.

One notable dimension of this historical turn is that place distinctiveness increasingly seems to be marked by public reference to the past, and – sometimes and seemingly more often – to multiple pasts. Places are publicly imbued with time-depth through reference to historical narratives, and their historical content legitimated through institutions such as exhibitions, local history books and memorial plaques. This might be described as 'historical theming' – representing places through sets of public memories in order to configure what are assumed will be identifiably individuated 'lands'. Ironically, rather than differentiating, this theming risks creating an apparent sameness of place – a set of familiar contours shaping a continuous land even as we cross boundaries – through its promulgation of similar strategies or techniques of historical marking. 'Memoryland' might easily be the name of a theme-park, or section of one; and 'place marketing' and 'image-management' are certainly involved in producing historicised village-, town- and cityscapes across Europe. But this is not the whole story and we need to probe further in order to understand why this form of thematisation occurs at all, and in order to perceive the various motives for both pursuing and challenging it. We also need to probe further if we are to perceive differences within the various ways of performing history and memory, as well as to hear the numerous voices that can be involved, and thus acknowledge the need to speak of 'memorylands' in the plural.

Many of the terms that have been coined to characterise the increased public attention to the past draw on the language of pathology ('mania', 'epidemic', 'fever', obsession', 'craze') or employ other terms that carry negative connotations ('crusade', 'industry'). This is expressive of an anxious perspective that many commentators adopt; and it is further entrenched through dualisms that pit the apparently disturbing developments against what is regarded as an organic or authentic relationship with the past – sometimes described as 'tradition', or 'social memory' – which, furthermore, is widely believed to be under threat. Here, I seek neither to straightforwardly accept nor dismiss this perspective. It is, in my view, itself thoroughly and constitutively part of that which it seeks to describe. In other words, the concern expressed about the 'memory mania' and its correlated preoccupation with questions of authenticity and loss are part of the ways in which the past is 'done' in Europe today. My choice of the term 'memory phenomenon' (cf. Kansteiner 2002: 183), then, is intended as less affectively loaded and also as a means of encompassing not only the expansion of public preoccupation with the past but also popular and academic debates and concerns about it.

The memory complex

If the memory phenomenon is the notable increase in attention to the past – and attention to that attention – that has been underway since the second half of the twentieth century, the memory complex is the wider whole of which it is part. Although I use the term memory complex, it should be seen as shorthand for something like 'the memory-heritage-identity complex' for these are all tightly interwoven. In choosing to use the term 'complex' I have been influenced by its meanings in a number of disciplines, as well as its etymology and allusion to complexity theory. Its general meaning is of an entity 'consisting of parts united or combined' (Oxford Etymological Dictionary). Its etymology also carries connotations that are apposite for my use here. Derived from the Latin *complexus,* past participle of *complectere,* meaning 'encompass, embrace, comprehend, comprise', it is also 'sometimes analysed as … woven' (Concise Oxford English Dictionary). A complex, in the sense that I want to develop it here, comprises different elements, woven more or less loosely together. It also has a propulsion towards further encompassment partly through offering what becomes an increasingly taken-for-granted form of comprehending and experiencing.

The ways in which the term 'complex' is used in various disciplines can help, by analogy, to explain this further. A chemical complex is a substance that is 'formed by a combination of compounds' (COED); 'the formation of complexes', says the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 'has a strong effect on the behaviour of solutions'.[5] In Mathematics, complex numbers are made up of real and imaginary parts, the latter being used to help solve mathematical problems that cannot be solved with real numbers alone; and in Linguistics a complex sentence is one including subordinate clauses. What I want to draw out from these is the idea of the complex as consisting of non-exhaustive patterned combinations and relationships; and of complexes themselves gaining autonomous meanings, effects and possibilities for 'going on'.

I do not, however, want to adopt the popular psychological connotation of a 'complex' as being a pathological psychic-emotional condition, though in Carl Jung's introduction of the term into psychology, he did not regard a complex as necessarily negative (Jung 1971/1921). His understanding of a complex as a meshing of parts and tendencies that add up to some pattern to which we might put a name, and that we can identify with particular effects, does capture the sense of complex that I am striving for here. In addition, Jung's emphasis on the mix of the cognitive, affective and physical, and his argument about the relevance of history and myth, resonates with what I regard as necessary to include in an understanding of the memory complex, though I do not position my perspective within, or draw on other aspects of, his wider theorising.

Assemblage and complexity

My use of the notion of 'complex' is similar to that of 'assemblage' as it has come to be used in recent years in some social and cultural theorising.[6] Both

designate some kind of 'entity' made up of constituent inter-related parts that then has effects (assemblage theory often refers to 'potentials' or 'capacities') of its own. As with assemblage, I also want to stress that a complex is not an abstraction, though it may contain abstractions. Rather, it is made up, variously, of constituent practices, affects and materialisations. The memory complex can be seen, therefore, as an assemblage of practices, affects and physical things, which includes such parts as memorial services, nostalgia and historical artefacts. Moreover, assemblage theory insists that we be wary of taking particular objects or categories for granted and that to do this we should investigate specific instances – so, for example, we should examine particular shops and markets rather than simply 'the market', or particular museums and heritage sites rather than 'heritage' as a generalised category. By doing so, we can recognise the potential variety of forms that a wider term might designate. In addition, we can apprehend the particular mix of human and non-human, conceptual and physical, elements that are involved in constituting a particular assemblage/complex; and we can also identify the processes that contribute to, say, making certain notions or ways of doing things durable or making them capable of extending beyond their locality of origin.

This characterisation fits the approach of this book well, in that it gathers its material from specific instances and gives attention to a wide range of elements, including the materialisation of memory in heritage. Little of the research that I report here, however, has been conceived explicitly within an assemblage perspective. The studies on which I draw are nevertheless often amenable to consideration in relation to assemblage ideas because, as Bruno Latour, one of the architects of an assemblage approach, acknowledges, anthropological research is frequently conducted with just such an emphasis on looking at what actually goes on and interrogating what is taken-for-granted, and thus refrains as far as possible from imputing 'external' (or he says, 'magical') categories (2005: 68). Indeed, this is why much anthropological theorising proceeds by questioning existing theoretical positions by unsettling their assumptions through in-depth ethnographic examples. This methodological prudence of assemblage and much anthropological theorising extends also to its imputations of agency and causality. Again, there is an emphasis on empirical investigation coupled with a rejection of assumptions of linear causality or singular agents: instead, the stress is on the complex and particular coming together of a mix of agents (human and non-human), and on unpredictable – though not unpatterned and random – effects.

The point that complexity should not be seen as random or chaotic is important and is one reason for the fact that assemblage theory and complexity theory (which is referenced to many of the same authors and shares many of the same ideas)[7] have produced an extensive vocabulary of terms to try to identify and characterise processes and patterns. The natural sciences have provided particular inspiration here, complexity and assemblage theorising variously employing terms such as 'feedback', 'circulation', 'density', 'principles

of association', 'attractors; 'emergent properties' and the like. While these can be thought-provoking and illuminating in specific analyses – and I employ some below – I do not seek to use them in any extensive way here. This is primarily because the production of these more general characterisations and distinctions is not my ambition. Rather, I am interested in exploring the specific constellation of the memory phenomenon in Europe and the memory complex of which it is part. This requires, in my view, attention also to meso-level theorising, which can often illuminate particular formations and processes better than can a jump straight to broad ontological claims. In addition, my analysis gives more emphasis to human meaning-making, linguistic connotations and the like than is typically given the case in assemblage theory, though it does not necessarily rule these out.[8] In the chapters that follow, then, I only occasionally draw directly on the language of assemblage. This includes using the term 'assemblage' for specific constellations within the peculiar agglomeration of elements concerned with memory that is the overall focus of my investigation, and that I dub the memory complex. Nevertheless, there are other ways in which much of the research discussed here resonates with assemblage theory, including an emphasis on materiality, as discussed further below.

Methodology

Although I give particular attention to research carried out by anthropologists, I put this into dialogue with theorising from many disciplines and I do not exclude empirical work carried out within other disciplinary approaches where it bears upon the discussion at hand. This is especially so in Chapter 3, which is concerned with method and includes discussion of the relationship between anthropological and historical research. Personally, I am inclined towards methodological pluralism and believe that bringing together research conducted within different disciplinary approaches can be analytically powerful, though it needs careful coordination and attention to methodological issues. Here, however, I particularly want to show what anthropological approaches can contribute to European memory debates and so for the most part my case studies are of research conducted by anthropologists of Europe. Doing so will, I hope, also be of value for future multi-disciplinary research.

My use of the term 'anthropology' needs some clarification here as not all of those who I discuss as 'anthropologists' would necessarily use this term themselves. Across Europe, as well as beyond it, there is some inconsistency in the ways in which 'anthropology' and related terms, such as 'ethnology' and 'ethnography', are used. Here, I do not include biological or physical anthropology; rather, my compass is what in the British tradition is usually called social anthropology and in North America is referred to as cultural anthropology. Although non-European societies were the main focus of these disciplines historically, this is no longer so. This is also the case in many but not all continental European traditions, in which there is often a distinction made

between 'anthropology' as referring to work outside Europe and ethnology to refer to that undertaken within, or sometimes more specifically still, the home nation-state. In Germany, for example, a distinction is institutionalised between *Völkerkunde,* focusing on peoples outside Europe, and *Volkskunde,* looking at those within. Today the names have sometimes changed, with *Sozial Anthropologie* sometimes being used in place of *Völkerkunde,* and *Ethnologie,* or sometimes more specifically, 'European Ethnology' (*Europäische Ethnologie)*, on research within Europe, though there is increasing overlap, represented in a greater use of the term 'cultural anthropology'.[9] As in many other continental European countries, German ethnology had and often still has a strong overlap with folklore, sometimes being indistinguishable from it. In using the term 'anthropology', then, I do so in catholic fashion, to include what might elsewhere be called 'ethnology' or equivalents in various languages. This does not mean, however, that I cover all of the various forms of 'anthropology' being conducted within Europe, and for the most part I do not include the more folkloric work. Rather, I make my arguments through selected examples of research that, while it may go under various labels, mostly adopts approaches consonant with those I outline in the rest of this section.

The research included here puts an emphasis on qualitative methods conducted within a *Verstehen* approach that aims to grasp participants' perspectives and experiences – an approach that goes beyond recording of voices and cultural collecting, typical of folklore as classically conceived.[10] It generally involves a commitment to considering social and cultural phenomena as 'total' or 'totalities' in a sense used by one of the founders of French ethnology, Marcel Mauss (1872–1950).[11] Although there is debate about his use of this term, one of the main ways in which he used it was to emphasise how what might initially appear as different aspects of social life or human experience might be interrelated. So, a social phenomenon – such as the gift or sacrifice – might cut across categories such as the economy or religion, and thus could not be properly understood if their analysis was restricted to these. Ethnology was valuable in his view precisely because it allowed for attention to the concrete and complexity that he saw as lacking in the reductionism and abstraction of the new discipline of sociology being propounded by Durkheim, his uncle (Hart 2007). Significantly, his view of the importance of 'totality' in this sense was informed by his study of diverse cultures, predominantly non-European, which also made him aware of the limitations of analysis that restricted itself to Western categories, as well as of the challenge to dominant assumptions that such studies could provide. Although Mauss' own research was conducted second-hand, through examining studies undertaken by others, other anthropologists have developed methods that allow for an ethnological grasping of 'totality' and potentially also for challenging of analytical categories.

These methods are usually called ethnographic and typically involve some kind of in-depth and fairly small-scale study, often over a lengthy time period.[12] Although participant-observation is sometimes regarded as synonymous with

ethnography, anthropologists may employ a wide range of specific methods, such as oral histories, semi-structured interviews, spatial mapping, photography, film-making and other visual and sensory methodologies, as well as textual analysis, and sometimes also surveys (e.g. of households). Rather than the application of a particular methodological toolkit, what characterises the anthropological approach is a commitment to trying to see and experience life-worlds from the point of view of those who live them and within the context of which they are part. This goes beyond simply recording 'native voices' but entails a rigorous commitment to trying to grasp the patterns of relations of which utterances, practices, feelings and so forth, are part; and what they may be linked with. This frequently involves or leads to reflexivity about categories of analysis and forms of knowledge production – including the role of scholarship itself.

The emphasis on the small-scale deserves note here too. This allows for attention to detail that can potentially disrupt more generalising accounts. In addition, it may also open up the opportunity to hear 'quiet voices' or see perspectives or recognise feelings that are easily overlooked, either because they are held by people with little access to forms of expression that reach a wide public or because the forms that the expression takes are not usually recognised by the academy. A smaller scale of research also allows for direct interaction by the researcher, an approach in which their person and own history may become part of the study, as we will see in some examples below. Furthermore, a smaller scale can make it easier to see the connections between aspects of life or the multi-dimensionality of practices in a way consonant with Mauss' notion of totality. This does not mean, however, that research need only look at 'small' topics or for connections between what has been directly examined within the specific empirical study. Here, the notion of 'totality' potentially causes problems if it is understood as indicating a bounded self-integrated system, as Durkheim theorised in his functional understanding of 'society'. While many anthropological studies up until about the 1960s, and in some cases since, have been undertaken in a functionalist framework, which in European anthropological research often meant that the village was taken as the functioning unit and 'natural' object of study, since then researchers have increasingly rejected this model and sought ways of exploring connections across and beyond boundaries, and finding ways to bring insights from their micro-perspectives to 'speak out'.[13] To do so they have often developed new approaches, as we will see in later chapters, while still retaining a commitment to concrete study of specific worlds, events or phenomena. As Regina Bendix argues in a discussion of the distinctive perspective offered by cultural anthropology on the 'big' topic of 'global heritage', for example, 'only such micro approaches, in fact, can properly reveal the local specificity of a global heritage regime' (2009: 255). Only such approaches can show what notions such as 'global heritage regime' might mean and how they might work in practice. The global is, after all, inevitably imagined and realised in particular, local, worlds – 'worlds' which might equally be UNESCO meetings or remote villages.[14]

The problem with memory

Although I have so far cast the topic of this book in terms of memory – memorylands, the memory phenomenon and the memory complex – I want in this section to add some reservations, warnings and clarifications about its use. I then provide a brief introduction to some of the many classifications of types of memory and remembering that scholars have employed, and also look at some other possible ways of framing the analysis. A major problem with memory as a category of analysis is its very ubiquity and capaciousness,[15] which is itself part of the memory phenomenon that this book explores. The fact that 'memory' can refer to a mental function or faculty (the act of remembering or ability to do so), and also to content (what is remembered) renders it widely applicable. This partly accounts for why it is used in numerous disciplines and areas of popular culture, ranging from concerns over false-memory syndrome to the technical capacity of digital storage, from neurological studies of everyday mnemonic capabilities to social investigation of collective remembering. While this book mainly addresses the last of these, it is important to note that these different concerns are not disconnected but may feed into, shape and sustain one another. Loss of cultural memory, for example, may be likened to Alzheimer's; forms of organising digital storage may be configured through cultural forms such as the filing cabinet (documents, files). The analogy between individual or personal recollection and social or cultural is pervasive and informs understanding of both – and, as such, needs itself to be given analytical attention.

Making such analogies is not itself new, individual memory almost always being conceptualised through cultural forms. In medieval Europe, for example, memory was often conceptualised as parchment, and, thus, as a medium capable of bearing imprints of experience or as a hive of bees or forest or – when properly trained – a library, thesaurus or storage room.[16] Prevalent metaphors may change – today computers are more likely analogies than parchment – and this plays into how memory is understood, undertaken and even researched.[17] Some analogies, for example, more readily support attempts to train the memory, or they regard it as springing surprises as cobwebs are swept from its dark recesses or as environmental stimuli spark involuntary firing of neural connections. Not only does the cultural provide metaphors for individual memory, however, there is also, according to Pierre Nora, 'an exact chronological coincidence' between a 'preoccupation with the individual psychology of remembering' and the rise of concern about the loss of social memory (1989: 15). He dates this to the end of the nineteenth century, and associates it especially with 'the disintegration of the rural world' (1989: 15). What we see with the vanishing of the pre-modern, he writes, is that 'memory appeared … at the core of psychological personality, with Freud; at the heart of literary autobiography, with Proust' (1989: 15). 'We owe to Freud and to Proust', he adds, 'those two intimate and yet universal sites of memory, the primal scene and the celebrated *petite madeleine*' (1989: 15). Since then, he argues, preoccupation with memory has only increased,

escalating in the twentieth-century modern proliferation of what he calls *lieux de memoire* – 'sites of memory' – and further still in what he sees as a late twentieth-century postmodern acceleration. The traffic between theories of individual and of collective remembering has likewise burgeoned, with psychological ideas designed to understand individual memory increasingly being applied to collective or social memory.

Individual and collective

Psychological and psychoanalytic concepts devised for individual memory that have been used in relation to collective or social memory, include 'trauma', 'the unconscious', 'repression', 'flash-bulb memories', 'semantic memory' and 'episodic remembering'. In popular accounts this use is generally seamless, with little apparent consideration of whether such terms might be appropriate, and this is sometimes the case too in academic work, though there is also careful and illuminating use (as we will see in subsequent chapters). The potential problem, however, is that the social and individual become conflated and it is assumed that collectives work in the same way that individual psychology is theorised as doing, e.g. that nations have an unconscious and that they may suffer psychological trauma from the effects of repressing memories.[18] Used loosely, such notions naturalise processes and leave exploration of what might actually be going on untouched. Furthermore, the individualised psychological model treats 'memory [as] a distinct phenomenon that can be studied in relative isolation from other mental functions' (Wertsch 2009: 122). Memory thus becomes understood as involving various relatively autonomous known processes rather than through its specific workings and possible connections of a Maussian 'total' kind.

As Michael Lambek argues, this also takes for granted a model of autonomous individuals as vessels of memory. Drawing on Mauss' notion of *personnage* – a role-related and intersubjectively constituted notion of personhood – and his ethnographic research on spirit possession in Madagascar to highlight alternatives to this model, he argues that in 'Western discourse' memory has been made a 'romanticized object' (2003: 210). By the latter – a term that he borrows from Hannah Arendt – he means a form of naturalisation, that turns a supposed quality ('Jewishness' is her example) into a 'thing', then taken for granted as, variously, explanation, property of subjects and object of investigation. This then, in turn, supports the assumption of autonomous individuals. As he notes, similar processes occur at collective level, the elision between individual and collective memory reinforcing an individuation of collectives through attribution of shared memory. In discussions of personal identity, memory is almost always a key theme, often being regarded as a kind of glue, holding identity together over time. As such, memory – as a body of recollection – can itself become an indicator of identity. This is a notion that works powerfully in the social domain and informs the centrality of memory

and heritage debates in the politics of recognition and identity. Implicated here too is the conceptualisation of memory as a possession – as something that we 'have' rather than 'do' (Lambek 1996); and this is reflected in the persistence of metaphors of memory as a treasure house, museum or archive. This in turn helps substantiate the notion of identities as individuated and 'possessive', a model that political theorist C.B. MacPherson (1962) argues had become an assumption amongst seventeenth-century English liberals and is 'not abandoned yet' (1962: 4). He describes this 'possessive individualism' as entailing a 'conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities … as an owner of himself' (1962: 3). This was notably and influentially articulated by John Locke, in his 'forensic' conception of 'the person', in which primacy was given to memory – 'consciousness of the past' – as an indicator of personal identity.[19] This same conception infuses that of the nation-state, which flowered within Western Europe in the eighteenth century and has spread across much of the world since.[20] Nations are thus conceptualised as possessive individuals, with heritage acting as the materialised rendition of their memory as property. In a self-supporting reverse move, 'having' – possessing – a distinctive heritage, memory and culture helps to instantiate and substantiate the nation (or other collective) 'as a living individual' (Handler 1988: 41). These cultural assumptions are interrelated and mutually reinforcing parts in Europe's memory complex.[21]

None of this means avoiding examining the relationship between individual and collective remembering. It is, rather, a call for attention to the movement and implications of models and terms, including those used in analysis. In order to avoid some of the problems with 'memory', Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (1999; see also Winter 2009) suggest employing the term 'remembrance' as a means of putting emphasis onto *processes* and *practices* of remembering and to avoid reifying 'memory' as an object. Framing research as 'remembrance', they contend, allows for investigation of the articulation of individual and collective remembering, rather than assuming a 'collective' memory that is necessarily shared by individuals. Anthropological approaches are especially well suited to accomplishing this, they argue, as they give attention to the differential roles and agency of different participants as well as to cultural forms (e.g. rituals or monuments) of remembrance.

Theirs is a thoughtful proposition that works well for the explicit forms of commemoration with which they are concerned. It does not, however, capture the full range of practices and processes that are involved in the memory phenomenon and memory complex. While these all entail reference to the past in some form, they are not necessarily forms of remembrance in the sense of either commemorating or actively remembering a particular past. Indeed, some engagements with 'the past' may entail very little 'remembering' or even memory content at all. This is one reason why I have suggested 'past presencing' as a possibly preferable alternative means of framing investigation (Macdonald 2012). Not only does this allow for consideration of a broader range

of phenomena, without assuming either intentional recollection, or pre-given processes or known actors, it also avoids some of the problematic distinctions of which memory is part – especially that between history and memory. I return to it below, after consideration of various other distinctions and terms. I should note, however, that despite the shortcomings of 'memory', I continue to use it in this book because the phenomenon with which I am concerned is usually framed in this way, as is so much relevant debate.

Memory and history

In popular and also academic discourse, especially that of historians, memory is often defined through a distinction with history.[22] Like 'memory', the English word 'history' is ambiguous, referring both to the past – what happened – as well as to accounts of that past and study of it. This ambiguity supports a popular vision of historical scholarship as an objective enterprise of establishing the facts of what happened; and also of the past as a body of factual evidence. Memory, when opposed to this vision of history, is regarded as subjective and fallible, based on individual recollections rather than proper evidence verified through expert institutional practices and persons. While this opposition is prevalent in Europe today, it is increasingly – as part of the memory phenomenon – accompanied, and sometimes supplanted, by a reversed evaluation. This sees established history become suspect as the product of elites, who are said to mystify their interests under the misleading banner of value-free facts. Memory, meanwhile, is elevated to a status of greater 'honesty', and seen as relatively unmediated and transparent in its very subjectivity.[23]

Pierre Nora's classic work, which operates at one level as an insightful discussion of the memory phenomenon, has also been a significant player in a reversed evaluation – and moralisation – of history and memory. He writes, for example, of

> the difference between real memory – social and unviolated … and history, which is how our hopelessly forgetful modern societies, propelled by change, organize the past … Memory is life… History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer.
>
> (1989: 8)

Memory here is romanticised as an organic part of life, and therefore 'real', and history vilified as a sterile and doomed attempt to capture a past that has been lost. This is part of a relentless discourse that seeks to identify and even rescue authentic forms of life, and that is more usefully seen as part of the memory phenomenon that he discusses rather than analysis of it.

Drawing and maintaining a clear-cut distinction between history and memory can cause as many analytical problems as it solves, as many commentators have

pointed out.[24] In particular, it tends to direct attention to questions of veracity – which provides the truer account of the past? While this is a legitimate question, it cannot be answered in general terms and requires clarification of what is meant by 'truth' (e.g. recounted with personal integrity, accuracy with relation to other known facts).[25] Moreover, in research practice, the line between history and memory may be blurred. For example, an historical account might draw on individual reminiscences, and remembered events may find ample substantiation in other contemporary sources – or even be recalled with reference to them (e.g. discussion of individual experience of war following a television documentary or getting out the official album of the Queen's coronation during individual reminiscence). The more important issue is the specific contexts, motives and frameworks of production of the various accounts and their forms of veracity. Also significant from an anthropological perspective – as we will see in later chapters – is how the terms themselves are variously defined and deployed in their use, and the evaluations that they are given.

Memory terminologies and alternatives

Because of the looseness of terms such as 'memory' and 'history', there has been a proliferation of related terms created either to better frame the field of study or to make distinctions between kinds of processes or practices. It is not my intention to discuss this in detail but I offer a brief commentary here on some of the terms most commonly in use, and others that I regard as particularly helpful. Others are introduced as they arise in specific discussions later in the book.

Collective, social, cultural … memory

The terms 'collective memory' and 'social memory' are used to differentiate from personal or individual memory and to refer instead to memories that are held by social groups and/or forms of remembering that are held in some kind of common. They are usually referenced to French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945), whose work in this field was posthumously published as *La Mémoire Collective* (1950).[26] His concern was to emphasise the importance of social groups in creating frameworks for remembering – for example, the role of the family in transmitting memory – and also the significance of shared memory for creating senses of collective solidarity. Halbwachs has been criticised for taking for granted the existence of stable social entities as the producers of memory, and for overstating the determining role of the collective memory so produced for individual remembering.[27] Most of those using the terms subsequently, however, do not adopt Halbwachs' position wholesale; and much productive work has been undertaken under these rubrics on questions such as how creating shared memories might be part of creating social entities (e.g. the nation), rather than the other way around, or investigating the various positions that individuals might adopt in relation to collective commemoration.

In my own use here I likewise use 'social memory' and 'collective memory' to refer to accounts or representations of the past that make some kind of claim to being shared rather than assuming that 'collective' means necessarily held by all. Another attractive alternative, however, is James E. Young's 'collected memory' (1993), employed in his study of memorials in order to theorise these as sites around which diverse memories may accumulate. Rather than directing attention to what is shared by participants in memory practices, a collected memory approach leaves open the question of whether those engaging in a practice necessarily attribute it with the same meanings.

'Social memory' and 'cultural memory' are sometimes deployed interchangeably. It is useful for analysis, however, to use 'cultural memory' more specifically to indicate memory whose primary form of transmission is through cultural media, such as texts, film and television, and museums and exhibitions, rather than through direct person-to-person transmission. Although the dividing line may blur here too – visiting a museum, for example, is also a social practice involving person-to-person contact – it is helpful in that it directs analytical concern to questions of how memory is mediated and the implications of this for matters such as its durability over time or capacity to 'travel' across space. Materialised into cultural forms, the resources for cultural memory may remain even when direct transmission of social memory – or what Jan Assmann (2008) calls 'communicative memory' – no longer occurs. In some research the term 'social memory' is reserved for this direct communicative memory but more usually it includes both communicative and cultural memory as defined here, and this is the sense in which it is used in this book.

Historical consciousness and past presencing

In order to avoid some of the problems of the history/memory distinction and to put emphasis firmly onto questions of *how* the past is conceptualised and represented, some researchers choose to frame their investigation in terms of 'historical consciousness', as we will see in later chapters. This draws attention to questions about matters such as the 'narrative structures' or 'temporal orientations' through which the past is apprehended.[28] Although work of this kind does not always assume that people will be aware of the forms that their historical thinking takes, the term 'historical consciousness' can be confusing in that it implies active awareness. Moreover, this *is* how it is used by some theorists. In Gadamer's classical discussion, for example, he is concerned to specify the development of a reflexive – historically conscious – relationship to history.[29] Rather differently, it is also often used in discussions of history education, sometimes in laments over the lack of historical knowledge ('historical awareness') of particular social groups (see Chapter 2). Another shortcoming of the term – and of most though not all research undertaken under its rubric – is that it directs attention to cognitive process rather than to more embodied modes of engaging with the past.

In suggesting 'past presencing' as a way of demarcating the field of study, my intention is to find a broad frame that allows for as much Maussian totalising as possible; and that allows for unconscious or embodied relationships with the past as well as more conceptual ones.[30] This aims to avoid pre-defining what is involved in a wide array of social and cultural engagements with the past. It also tries to avoid the dilemma of 'analytic double-take' (Macdonald 2012: 234), where those being studied use the same language as that being used to frame analysis. That is, by using a terminology that is not part of what Gable and Handler describe as 'native discourse of memory' (2011: 43), it seeks analytical leverage on the fact that terms such as 'memory' and 'history' are part of the 'memory phenomenon' under investigation. By so doing, it aims also to avoid the usual dualisms and connotations that infuse these debates. One charge against this way of framing the debate might be that it does not perform a theoretical refinement by narrowing down and making the field more precise.[31] It seems to me, however, that what is required at this stage in research is a broad recasting of the field that does not overly constrict its scope and that conceptual refinement – for example, exploring differentiations between specific processes – can then proceed more effectively. Another possible charge is that 'past presencing' is presentist: its concern is with how the past is related to at specified moments or stretches of time. In defining the field in this way, however, my intention is not to say that historical research should be conducted in this way – historians can continue about their business as they please! I make no assumptions that the only worth or interest of the past is in its relation or use in the present – the argument is simply for looking at this. Neither do I maintain that such an approach cannot be tackled historically. Although much anthropological research does involve direct study of ongoing action, not all does so and how the past was made present in the past is as fully valid a focus for attention as is 'past presencing' in the present. The analytical 'present' of study might well be the past – indeed, it is inevitably so, if only recent.

It should also be emphasised that 'past presencing' does not entail taking for granted what will be considered 'past' or 'present' in practice, neither indeed whether a distinction will operate between these; on the contrary, part of its point is to indicate the elision and indeterminacy that is so often involved, and the disruption of linear notions of past preceding present preceding future. Ghosts, monuments, and old furniture are some of the many means by which the past may inhabit the present – and the future – or perhaps that a continuous past may embrace present and future. While linguistically differentiating between past, present and future operates widely in Europe, and all its indigenous languages, Indo-European and not (e.g. Basque, Hungarian), have a past tense, there are nevertheless differences between languages in which grammatical tenses are deemed appropriate when (for example, German often uses the present tense where English would use past or future), as well as in the tenses themselves (for example, French has many different past tenses, making distinctions such as between repeated actions that used to occur and actions

that are completely finished in the past). Likewise, in social practice, though not necessarily mapping directly onto languages, there can be distinctions between kinds of pasts – variously related to as fully over, periodised, continuing or likely to return; as well as of presents and futures, and the relations between them – linear, cumulative, non-cumulative, progressive, regressive, reversible, irreversible, disconnected, cyclical, rhythmic, looping, spiralling and so forth.[32] Past-presencing, then, necessarily gives attention to temporality. Reinhart Koselleck's philosophical reflections on how 'time is historically enacted in humans as historical beings' suggests that the present is 'elusive' and constituted 'in the relationship between past and future' (2002: 111). Although the 'temporal dimension' that he calls 'space of experience' most closely maps onto what I am here calling 'past presencing' – namely, the framework 'out of which one acts, in which past things are present or can be remembered' (2002: 111) – this is tightly bound up with a more future-oriented form of temporality that he calls 'horizon of expectation'.[33] How we conceive the future has implications for how we conceive the present and the past – and vice versa. More importantly, as he argues, the relationship between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation may shift (and has shifted significantly in Europe at certain historical moments (Koselleck 2004/1979)), thus altering, for example, the significance that the past is accorded in anticipations of the future. The implications of past presencing for imagining futures is a concern that runs through many chapters that follow.

Heritage

Another way of framing the concerns of this book – and that is also part of 'native discourse' – is 'heritage'. Over the past decade heritage studies has blossomed as a lively forum for debate, moving from a predominant concern with questions of conservation to interest in the politics and, more recently, the phenomenology of heritage.[34] There is a good deal of overlap with what is also considered under the rubric of memory studies, though the connotations and framing differ to some extent. Where 'memory' entices social researchers into analogies with individual memory and the language of psychology and also prompts questions about veracity and transmission, 'heritage' directs attention to materiality, durability over time and value. In more conservative heritage approaches, this may centre on questions about how to identify the worth of different kinds of heritage and manage it accordingly; but in critical heritage study it leads to interrogation of why and how some things come to count as 'heritage' and the consequences that flow from this. Because much discussion of heritage has been concerned with material forms – monuments, buildings and the like – research conducted in its terms has contributed some sophisticated discussion of 'intangible heritage'. Indeed, the very term 'intangible heritage' – for practices that might previously have been called 'tradition' – speaks to this framing.[35]

It also speaks, however, to what Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett calls the 'meta-cultural' status of heritage (2006) – the way in which once something is identified as 'heritage' it is inevitably altered. As she argues, this occurs in particular ways through 'metacultural operations' (2006: 162), such as conservation, listing and becoming part of the 'tourist gaze' (Urry 1990), which have multiple consequences for people and other things within its orbit and for its future. In like vein, Bernhard Tschofen points out that one 'banal but not self-evident' feature of heritage is that it 'can be visited' (2007: 26). Extending this, we can say that heritage turns the past into something visitable; and, as Tschofen contends, research should then consider the implications of heritage's *Präsenzeffekts* – the ways in which heritage makes the past's presence felt (2007: 29).[36] All of this contributes to making 'heritage' a productive focus of research. Heritage legislation, heritage management, heritage conventions, heritage tours, heritage sites and so on and so forth are thoroughly part of European memorylands, constituting an identifiable field of practice for investigation.

Heritage is, moreover, an especially efficacious element in the European memory complex, capable of reorganising land- and city-scapes and validating certain social groups (and not others). A manifestation of possessive individualism, heritage invariably implies ownership – at least metaphorical but usually actual property relations – and as such instantiates whosoever's heritage it is said to be. More broadly, one of the most important accomplishments of heritage is to turn the past from something that is simply there, or has merely happened, into an arena from which selections can be made and values derived. We might even put this as heritage turning the past into The Past.

As a set of metacultural operations, heritage is increasingly global. At the same time, however, what is meant by 'heritage' – and the expectations that flow from it – does not necessarily map seamlessly onto the diverse contexts in which it is put to work, even within Europe. An excellent edited collection of cultural anthropological research on heritage is entitled *Prädikat 'Heritage' (Predicate 'Heritage')* (Hemme *et al.* 2007). By using the English word 'heritage' in their German title, the editors neatly point out that it is this, English-language, term – and its specific connotations – that is being globalised, and that it acts as a predicate by asserting the very existence of 'heritage', as well as asserting as 'heritage' whatever it is attached to. As they explain, 'heritage' does not have a precise equivalent in German; and neither does it in most other European languages.[37] In German, the usual term used in relation to heritage developments such as conservation and listing is *Denkmal* (e.g. *Denkmalschutz* for heritage conservation), which also means 'monument' and speaks to an emphasis on material and public heritage. By contrast, *patrimoine* in French and *patrimonio* in Spanish have as part of their etymological root the notion of 'country' and yet can apply to personal inheritance as well as collective.[38] While the inflections may be slight, they can have consequences for heritage practice, as discussed in Chapter 5 (with reference to the Scottish Gaelic term *dualchas)*. They highlight variations within the European memory complex – even while, at the same

time, the various conceptions may share at least some assumptions, as well as, perhaps, coming to resemble one another more closely as a consequence of predicate heritage.

Europe and others

As the preceding discussion shows, Europe is characterised by diversity as well as by certain prevalent – but not all encompassing – patterns. In describing such patterns, my intention is neither to suggest that these are necessarily exclusive to Europe, nor that they can be used as a means of identifying what is 'truly' European and what is not. Claims of exclusivity usually founder either in light of the global diffusion of cultural forms, such as the nation-state or 'predicate heritage', or in view of the fact that many cultural patterns prevalent in Europe – such as using items of material culture as mementoes of the dead or telling linear histories – can be found in other places too. More important, however, is that my aim in discussing patterns is not to highlight Europe's uniqueness – an enterprise that is widely undertaken in service of substantiating and legitimating 'Europe'. Doubtless, Europe *is* unique – but this is just a banal fact and it is not *more* (or less) unique than any other continent.

Anthropology has often employed an opposition between Europe (sometimes glossed as 'the West') and other parts of the world in its analyses. Claude Lévi-Strauss's distinction between 'hot' and 'cold' societies, for example, characterises 'our' (European) societies as 'hot' in that time is conceived as linear, changing and unrepeatable; they are societies that 'have internalised their own historicity' (Gell 1992: 23).[39] 'Cold' societies, by contrast, conceive themselves as closed systems, and operate according to mythical, repeatable or cyclical temporality. Many commentators have been critical of this idea, mainly because it reifies an absolute distinction that they deem untenable.[40] Eric Wolf, for example, provides a robust dismissal of the supposition that any people have been left 'outside history' in his ironically entitled *Europe and the People without History* (1982). As Kirsten Hastrup (1992: 2) points out, however, Wolf's argument retains an idea of history as an especially European phenomenon in its depiction of how European expansion has long and insistently affected lives around the globe. More undermining of the distinction are examples of the historical thinking that Lévi-Strauss dubs 'hot' in other parts of the world – as John Davis provides in an article that is a neat riff on Wolf's: 'History and the people without Europe' (1992). Also disruptive of the absolute nature of the opposition are examples of alternative modes of conceptualising temporality and history – what Hastrup calls 'other histories' – within Europe. Many examples will follow later in this book but to just make the point here, and to emphasise that alternatives are not somehow 'not European', we might turn to an example provided by Marc Abélès in his study of one of the most modern central locations of Europe – the European Commission in Brussels. The predominant temporality there, he argues, is quite counter to the pervasive historicising so widely seen in Europe.

Instead, amidst a relentless sense of urgency, '"One goes ahead without looking back, as if one were driving without a rear-view mirror"', as one official said to him (2000: 32). In consequence 'Everything happens as if the Commission was not able to think about its own relation to history' (2000: 32) – a form of historical consciousness (or non-consciousness perhaps) that he sees as part of the Commission's lack of institutional self-awareness.

Despite critiques of such oppositions – provided by exceptions and post-colonial nervousness over making Europe special – they can nevertheless be 'good to think with', to borrow from Lévi-Strauss' phraseology (1963/1962). Marilyn Strathern's contrasts between Melanesian ways of doing and thinking and those she calls 'Euro-American' is a notable case-in-point; and has led to extensive productive discussion as well as criticism for much the same reasons as those raised in relation to Lévi-Strauss' hot and cold division.[41] Highlighting alterity, as Strathern does, can be particularly valuable as a means of making us aware of what we might readily take for granted – e.g. notions of persons as individual rather than dividual. In my own thinking about concepts such as identity and memorial practices, it was often cases where these are done very differently or not at all that provoked me to 'see' the taken-for-granted cultural patterns in my own field-sites. For example, the assumption that prized material products should be preserved is challenged by the assertion among the Igbo of Nigeria that the creativity of artists is only released as the physical art-works decay.[42] This means that the preservation of what might be called 'material heritage' should be avoided, thus undermining an assumption that material continuity needs to accompany remembering.

As we will see in the chapters that follow, however, we do not necessarily need to look outside Europe to find alternatives to the more widespread patterns that contribute to the fluid and multivalent European memory complex. These alternatives are thoroughly part of the reality of Europe today and it is to these, as well as the more frequently encountered patterns, that this book attends. As such, its intention is neither to affirm Europe, nor to either dissolve it into diversity or to reclaim it through the very idea of its diversity (as has been the attempt in European Union initiatives and slogans of 'Unity in Diversity', see McDonald 1996). 'Europe' here, then, is primarily a heuristic – and a fairly loose one at that – for exploration. This necessarily entails treating 'Europe' not as a self-evident category but as itself variously, and sometimes uncertainly or acrimoniously, defined and characterised. Even with reference to geography, what counts as Europe is unclear and contested: are Russia and Turkey part of Europe or not, for example? From my point of view, the anthropological task is not to adjudicate on such questions but to see these questions as part of what constitutes Europe and to explore the motives and contexts of the different positions taken. Chris Hann points out, for example, that the Urals 'were nominated for the role of boundary marker only in the middle of the eighteenth century, when Russian intellectuals were determined to prove that the Czarist empire, or at least its capital and historic core, belonged to Europe

rather than to Asia' (2012: 88). Framing his own account in terms of 'Eurasia', Hann identifies various continuities and shared histories across Europe and Asia, and presents these too as challenging any taken-for-granted unity of the former (and, presumably, also the latter, though this is not stated). He also notes, as do many other ethnographers working in Europe, that what 'Europe' means to its inhabitants can vary substantially. Susan Gal has observed, for example, that 'for educated Hungarians, as for most inhabitants of the continent, "Europe" is less a geographical region or unique civilisation than a symbolic counter of identity' (1991: 444). This remains the case, though, as Hann points out, in the post-Socialist era this negative, oppositional understanding of 'Europe' may also be accompanied by a very different, celebratory and enthusiastic 'rejoining' of Europe (2012: 98).

This is probably also the place to say that this book does not attempt to survey or even refer to all of the different parts of Europe – that is not its purpose. Ethnographic research on Europe is itself uneven, with some areas long and well researched and others relatively neglected; and there are also regional variations in what themes are given attention, with research on memory being especially strong in Greece, for example. Even within this, however, my account is selective, mainly discussing work conducted within the British and North American anthropological traditions, and especially that of my own research areas; and within this still further by the narrative that I craft through what seem to me to be particularly telling examples and arguments. I also draw on my own research, which has been conducted in the UK, especially in Scotland and to some extent in England, and in Germany. This provides a range of contexts for past presencing – both rural and urban, of 'memory workers' – i.e. those officially concerned in various ways with public memory – and 'ordinary people', including tourists and 'the public'. Moreover, the UK and Germany provide contrasting national developments, with the UK 'disuniting' in the 1990s, as Scotland and to a lesser extent Wales gained greater political autonomy, while the two Germanys became reunified. In addition, they provide a contrast in terms of their relationship to 'Europe', with 'Europe' often being referred to as 'elsewhere' in the UK, whereas a sense of being 'at the heart of Europe' and of being 'European' is more usual (though by no means universal) in Germany.[43]

Preludes

This book is not a history of changing forms of memory and historiography in Europe – this would be a separate, fascinating, project. There are, however, certain shifts that have been discussed by historians that are a prelude to the current memory phenomenon. I have already noted the notion of possessive individualism, which, it has been argued, became widespread in Europe from the seventeenth century. This turned memory and the past – and awareness of the past – into crucial elements of identity, initially personal and then, especially from the late eighteenth century, national. Then, in a logic of inversion, that so

often seems to operate in the social sphere, a continuous memory or history could itself become a way of proclaiming distinctive, individuated entities. Moreover, in what we might call a logic of extension, which also operates widely, this became a model ever more widely applied – or 'pirated', as Benedict Anderson has nicely expressed it (1983: 66). This was especially so from the 1970s, with the development of what is often called 'identity politics', in which there was a flourishing of demands for recognition by groups of various kinds on the basis of their identities – usually ethnic but also of other kinds, such as sexuality. Seeking out shared memory and manifesting this in some form of heritage was a 'natural' implementation of the model.

The past as a foreign country?

David Lowenthal's claim that there was a shift in Europe in the late eighteenth century which saw the past increasingly thought about as a 'foreign country' (1985) – or set of foreign countries – initially seems to suggest a development that was at odds with that of possessive individualism, which posits the past as part of the continuing (though changing) self. Prior to the eighteenth century, he claims, the past was mostly thought about as 'much like the present' (1985: xvi) – as basically a playing out of a universal and unchanging human nature. Antiquity, for example, might be admired as an exemplar of how to do things well, but this was seen as a 'better' version of the present rather than as substantively different. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, a new perception of the past 'as a different realm, not just another country but a congeries of foreign lands endowed with unique histories and personalities' emerged (1985: xvi). Regarding the past as a foreign place, as distinct from the present, would seem to sever the continuities that could make the past substantiate present-day identities. In *The Heritage Crusade*, Lowenthal concedes the dilemma, acknowledging that the view of the past as fundamentally alien to the present is not easily accommodated with a perception of the past as 'our own possession' (1998: xv). His response is to blame historians for the view of the past as 'foreign and exotic', as a place that 'frustrates understanding: its events seem unfathomable, its denizens inscrutable' (1998: xiv). 'I suspect', he then adds, 'that few take historians' cautions to heart': '[p]robably most people, most of the time, view the past not as a foreign but as a deeply domestic realm' and for them heritage is fundamentally concerned with 'domesticating the past' (1998: xv).

Certainly, what the compendious *The Past is a Foreign Country* seems to illustrate above all is a remarkable *range* of ways of addressing the past; and perhaps he is swayed to overstate the case for difference on account of the tempting quotation from L.P. Hartley that provides his title: 'The past is a foreign country, they do things differently there' (quoted in Lowenthal 1985: xvi). Nevertheless, he does show the growth of an idea of the past as worth looking at not just for exemplars of the present but for the more detailed and varied content that

it could provide. Clearly, this is a kind of past that can be appropriated more readily to a model of distinctive histories possessed by distinctive nations. The past here is 'foreign' in that it may provide instances of practices that are no longer continued – such as stories and songs collected as part of the swathe of folkloristic collecting that swept Europe with the spread of the nation-state – and in that it can even set puzzles over why things were as they were. The past is separate and different from the present. But it is not incommensurable with it. Rather, it is seen as a precursor of particular presents and owners. Moreover, it is also increasingly understood as requiring investigation as a means not just of knowing what happened *then* but for understanding and demonstrating present day distinctiveness.

The new practices of conservation and rooting around in actual physical remnants of the past, of which Lowenthal provides ample documentation, show this well. Prior to the nineteenth century, even though Antiquity was widely admired, he explains, 'its physical remains were in the main neglected or destroyed' (1985: xvi). Only in the nineteenth century did archaeology grow as a popular practice and as a discipline.[44] So too did forms of preservation and restoration. According to Svetlana Boym:

> In the nineteenth century, for the first time in history, old monuments were restored in their original image. Throughout Italy churches were stripped of their baroque layers and eclectic additions and recreated in the Renaissance image, something that no Renaissance architect would ever imagine doing to a work of antiquity… By the end of the nineteenth century there is a debate between the defenders of complete restoration that proposes to remake historical and artistic monuments of the past in their unity and wholeness, and the lovers of unintentional memorials of the past: ruins, eclectic constructions, fragments that carry "age value". Unlike total reconstructions, they allowed one to experience historicity affectively, as an atmosphere, a space for reflection on the passage of time. (2001: 15)

If not wholly foreign, then, and worthy of trying to preserve both for the sense of historicity, of the passage of time itself, and as precursor of the present, the past was also in effect made into something visitable. It was, moreover, increasingly regarded as worthy of visiting for what it could 'tell'. Not an entirely foreign country, then, but a place where at least some things were done differently and that it was worth going to in order to learn from – and, moreover, to learn not only about others but also about one's self in *longue durée*.

The sciences of memory

The idea that the past provides clues to the present was also strengthened and expanded from the late nineteenth century by what Ian Hacking (1995) calls

the sciences of memory. His discussion is of multiple personality disorder, of which there was an 'epidemic' in the 1980s (1995: 8) – a timing that is surely not merely coincident with the memory phenomenon discussed here. He shows how the Lockean forensic notion of personal identity was a necessary precursor to late nineteenth-century sciences of memory and that these in turn established ideas that needed to be in place for the later flourishing of multiple personality disorder. His is a detailed and nuanced account to which I do insufficient justice here. A novel notion that these sciences helped instantiate, however, was what he describes as the idea, 'dazzling in its implausibility', that 'what we have *forgotten* is what forms our character, our personality, our soul' (1995: 209, my emphasis). Today, that idea is most readily associated with Freud's concept of the unconscious – in which form it has been widely popularised throughout Europe and beyond. As Hacking shows, however, the idea predates Freud and suffuses wider scientific ideas about memory as well as Freudian psychoanalysis.

Although Hacking's account is directly concerned with a medicalised disorder suffered by individuals, the idea that the past can reveal things about ourselves that we do not yet know but that might be shaping our responses and capacities – and that there is a need to develop specialised techniques to access these – has wider resonance. It, too, is one that I suggest can be seen as part of the European memory complex – widespread but far from universally mobilised within European memory cultures.

There is much more that could be discussed as part of the prelude to the memory phenomenon within Europe. This includes *inter alia* the rise of mass production and consumption – proliferating new material forms and accompanying moral concerns about them; new forms of 'mechanical reproduction', as Walter Benjamin called them in 1955 (Benjamin 1992), playing into new concerns with the simulated, real and authentic; migration and urbanisation entangled with searches for community and roots; growing disenchantment with modernity and progress, meaning that the future could not be relied upon to provide the best answer; fissures covered over by the nation-state opening up, and becoming exacerbated by riffing on the compulsion to express distinctive identity in a politics of recognition; and the experience of mass warfare and destruction of human life – and accompanying mourning and memorialising – on a scale never previously encountered in Europe. Many of these will be addressed in the chapters that follow. In these, we turn to anthropological research to venture into what this too can tell us about the memory complex and the memory phenomenon in the memorylands of Europe.

The rest of this book

Memorylands divides roughly into two halves, the first of which introduces a range of anthropological perspectives and history of research on past presencing, together with methodological discussion. The second half, from Chapter 5, deals more directly with specific dimensions of the memory phenomenon.

The division is, however, far from absolute and there is discussion in the first half of topics, such as post-Socialist nostalgia, that are also part of the memory phenomenon – as indeed is much that is discussed throughout the book; and many topics introduced in the first half – including methodology, forms and media of narration and past presencing – are further developed in discussions in the second half.

Chapter 2, *Making Histories,* looks at the growth of anthropological interest in questions about the past amongst anthropologists of Europe, including questions of tradition and the invention of tradition, and of historical consciousness. A major focus of work has been on the making of history; and, in this chapter, this is discussed through a range of examples from both earlier work and more recent, the latter including attempts to construct European history, traditions and historical consciousness, the last drawn from my own fieldwork in Germany.

Chapter 3, *Telling the Past,* takes a more methodological tack to discussion of anthropological interest in past presencing, including exploration of similarities and differences between anthropology and history; and the difficulty for anthropologists of dealing with temporality – what I call the multitemporal challenge. The chapter gives particular attention to how the past is told and what the very forms of telling might themselves indicate. It also provides examples of various experimental anthropological work that tackles the multitemporal challenge in novel ways.

Not all past presencing, however, takes narrative form, as is acknowledged in various chapters but addressed most extensively in Chapter 4, *Feeling the Past.* This looks directly at questions of affect, materiality, embodiment and place and discusses a range of insightful ethnographic research that seeks to explore the implications of these for memory and other relationships with the past. In particular, it considers 'nostalgia' – a longing for the past; and especially the emergence of nostalgia for the Socialist past in post-Socialist Europe.

Chapter 5, *Selling the Past,* looks at one of the major memory phenomenon debates – that concerning the commodification of the past, or what is sometimes called 'the heritage industry', and accompanying concern about authenticity. To explore the questions in depth, the chapter includes an extended case-study of a heritage centre from my fieldwork in the Isle of Skye. Questions of materiality raised in the previous chapter, as well as alternative conceptualisations of 'heritage', are further developed here.

Chapter 6, *Musealisation,* looks at the memory phenomenon from the perspective of the growth of museumisation or heritagisation of everyday and folk life. It charts the growth of these forms of past presencing and engages with a range of influential theories about the museum phenomenon. Through another case study from the Isle of Skye – that acts as a partner to that in the previous chapter – it proposes some more specific concepts and an alternative, more reflexive, perspective on what is involved.

Like the two preceding chapters, Chapter 7, *Transcultural Heritage,* has a central focus on cultural agencies involved in past presencing: here, especially at

monuments, public sculpture and museums. Given that these played significant roles in the nineteenth-century articulation of bounded, homogeneous identities, especially national identities, and associated histories and heritage, this chapter explores whether they are capable of addressing and even encouraging more fluid, multiple and transcultural memories and identities. The discussion here focuses especially upon the transcultural in relation to migration from outside Europe, and includes debates about heritage in relation to multiculturalism, citizenship, Islam and the veil as heritage. How far transcultural forms indicate a transformation in the nature of the European public spheres is explored through a number of innovative examples.

The transcultural theme is continued in Chapter 8, *Cosmopolitan Memory,* which addresses arguments that the nation-state is receding as a frame of memory, replaced by more cosmopolitan memory forms. The Holocaust has been a major focus for this claim and this chapter charts the expansion of Holocaust heritage as well as exploring arguments about cosmopolitan memory through a range of anthropological research. I won't give the game away here about what it concludes but will note that, as throughout the book, anthropological research throws up new perspectives and complexities, challenging existing theorising.

Culminatory narratives, ending in futurology, are a familiar strand in the European memory complex repertoire. The final chapter, *The Future of Memory – and Forgetting,* does not escape its cultural conventions … entirely.

8

COSMOPOLITAN MEMORY

Holocaust commemoration and national identity

> If the past is not to bind us, where can duty lie?
>
> George Eliot[1]

In an influential argument, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider maintain that increasingly we are seeing a 'transition from national to *cosmopolitan* memory cultures' (2002: 88, 87; 2001). By this they mean that there has been a growth of forms of collective memory that are no longer primarily framed by the nation-state, or seen predominantly as the property of a particular nation or ethnic group, but that are instead relatively 'deterritorialised'. The Holocaust, according to their account, is 'the paradigmatic case' of such cosmopolitan memory; and has increasingly been decontextualised from its historical time and space, and, through processes of cultural mediation, turned into a universal and continually relevant 'moral story of good against evil' (2002: 98) whose central message is 'never again'. It has been turned from 'a set of facts' to 'an idea'; and increasingly is commemorated by people who have no direct connection to it (2002: 88), as witnessed not least in the proliferation of Holocaust memorials and museums and the millions of people across the globe who make treks, sometimes of thousands of miles, to visit them. Mostly, their argument about cosmopolitan memory is framed in terms of 'the global' or 'humanity', as when, for example, they argue that the deterritorialised cosmopolitan memory of the Holocaust plays a significant role in the development of a cosmopolitan politics of human rights (Levy and Sznaider 2002: 100). At others, however, 'cosmopolitan' is equated with 'European', as when they claim that the developments that they chart 'contribute to the creation of a common European cultural memory' (Levy and Sznaider 2002: 87).[2]

In this chapter, I explore the argument that a cosmopolitan memory, which 'cracks the container' of the nation-state as 'memory-holder', is underway, and that we are witnessing a growing Europeanisation and/or cosmopolitanisation of memory. I do so by looking at specific cases of what Novicka and Rovisco call 'cosmopolitanism in practice' in Europe (2009). As we will see, detailed studies often reveal tensions involved in such practice and also show how cosmopolitan developments can be made part of other assemblages, and 're-territorialised' or 'co-opted' in terms of other interests, too. As Levy and Sznaider's arguments focus especially upon the Holocaust, this chapter also considers the considerable expansion of commemoration and heritagisation of the Holocaust that has occurred in Europe – and beyond it – especially since the 1980s. Part of a wider expansion of 'difficult heritage' (Macdonald 2009a), the increased public attention to the Holocaust – or what is sometimes provocatively dubbed a 'Holocaust cult', 'the Holocaust industry', 'Shoah Business' or even 'post-Holocaust necrophilia'[3] – raises questions about why it should be subject to so much new heritagisation and commemoration over 50 years since it occurred.

Cosmopolitan memory

Levy and Sznaider's argument about cosmopolitan memory is that we are witnessing a process in which 'national and ethnic memories continue to exist' but they

> are subjected to a common patterning. They begin to develop in accord with common rhythms and periodizations. But in each case, the common elements combine with pre-existing elements to form something new… the result is always distinctive.
>
> (2002: 89)

We might conceptualize this, they say, as 'a process of "internal globalisation" through which global concerns become part of local experiences of an increasing number of people' (2002: 87). They illustrate this through a detailed charting of changes in ways that the Holocaust has been 'remembered' in Germany, Israel and the US, showing commonalities in its patterning since 1945, all of which contribute to the Holocaust becoming less 'a terrible aspect of a particular era' and instead 'a timeless and deterritorialized measuring stick for good and evil' (2002: 95).

First, there is a shift from social memory – first-hand biographical memories of those who lived through it – to historical or cultural memory, transmitted primarily through mediated representations. The latter allows for a globalisation of memory, especially through film and television. Here, they note how the US mini-series *Holocaust* in the 1970s and then films such as *Schindler's List* (1993) were widely disseminated around the world and also how they themselves universalised specific historical events into narratives of good and evil. *Schindler's*

List in particular helped to decouple the usual 'ethnic'/'national' identification of perpetration and victimhood by having a hero who is German. In such a representation, national identity is no longer depicted as the key determinant of where an individual stands in relation to the Holocaust. This, Levy and Sznaider see as part of a wider common patterning in which there is – to varying extents in the three countries – a diffusion of 'the distinction between memories of victims and perpetrators', resulting instead in a more generalised 'memory of a shared past' (2002: 103). The other common patterning of Holocaust memory, linked to its increasing universalism, is its 'future-orientation' (2002: 102). Applicable as an abstract principle, recollection of the Holocaust becomes primarily framed in terms of safeguarding against future repetition: 'Never again!' becomes the mantra.

Identification of the cosmopolitanising processes that Levy and Sznaider discuss with reference to the Holocaust have not yet been made as forcefully with reference to other countries or other 'memories'. In more recent work, however, they (sometimes with other colleagues) have sought to extend their arguments in various ways. This has included expanding the Holocaust argument to other countries, such as Austria and Poland, and exploring this too through analyses of public discourse and group interviews (Levy *et al.* 2011). Their research, they argue, provides evidence of a growing 'shared European memory', though also of national variations that they call 'reflexive particularism' (ibid.). They have also extended their argument to claim that a human rights discourse, which has its origins in the Holocaust, is now the discursive frame for any atrocity. And – in what seems a tautology but they see as part of the self-sustaining network of these ideas – they argue that (sometimes competing) cultural memories of atrocities have become the global currency for articulating notions of human rights (Levy and Sznaider 2010).

In an overlapping argument, together with Ulrich Beck, they claim that the Holocaust has informed a wider mobilisation of notions of forgiveness, guilt and restitution in international political relations – witnessed, for example, in public apologies by politicians.[4] The 'self-critique' inherent in such apologies and any associated reparations is, they argue, part of how 'cosmopolitan Europe' is being constituted (2009: 120). Thus, '[t]he radically self-critical European memory of the Holocaust does not destroy the identity of Europe, it constitutes this very identity' (ibid.). Although national histories are often referenced within this self-critique, and as part of the 'reflexive particularism' of Holocaust discussion, what is involved here, they claim, is that '[t]he nation is being remembered in order to overcome it' (2009: 125).

While Levy and Sznaider's position is primarily descriptive of a process that they are attempting to document, they sometimes present their case in terms of a normative cosmo-optimism – the view that cosmopolitanism is a good thing – as argued for by Ulrich Beck and others, such as Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006). It should be noted here that what is meant by cosmopolitanism varies to an extent between theorists, though an 'openness to difference' is generally

regarded as a key feature.[5] As Nina Glick-Schiller and colleagues point out, however, this is typically conceptualised in terms of a binary opposition between openness and closedness, with a concomitant understanding of openness as entailing some kind of celebration of difference (Glick-Schiller *et al.* 2011: 403). They suggest instead that we might focus on 'daily cosmopolitanism', understood in terms of 'relationalities of openness across differences', in which people are seen 'as capable of relationships of experiential commonalities despite differences' (ibid.: 410, 403). This potentially expands the field of what might be considered cosmopolitan as well as allowing for attention to some of the more subtle processes of making and experiencing commonality and difference that may be involved in everyday life, though it does not necessarily rule out the possibility that binary oppositions – including between openness and closedness – may be invoked in practice.

While politically I largely share a cosmo-optimistic viewpoint, my main concern below is investigative rather than normative. To this end, I examine the cosmopolitan memory thesis in relation to anthropological research in Europe in order to examine cosmopolitanism in various spheres of social life and cultural production. I do so primarily, though not exclusively, with reference to mobilisations of Holocaust memory. In what follows, then, I first provide a background to the rise of Holocaust commemoration and heritagisation in Europe, before examining arguments about cosmopolitanism through a range of ethnographic examples. As we will see, these pose various complications and problems for the cosmopolitan memory thesis in its current form and for a straightforward cosmo-optimistic outcome, though they also highlight some significant transformations underway within European memory cultures.

The rise of Holocaust commemoration and heritagisation

The timing that Levy and Sznaider see as marking a shift from social to cultural memory of the Holocaust can also be seen as that of the expansion of more widespread public Holocaust commemoration and heritagisation; as well as broadly coincident with the memory phenomenon. In various counties, such as Germany and the US, this 'Holocaust boom' began in the 1970s, with considerable further expansion in most of Europe, as well as in many countries beyond it, especially those in the New World, towards the end of the twentieth century and into the present one.[6] While the looming loss of first-hand social memory, resulting from the passing away of those who directly witnessed events, has certainly legitimated and fuelled the expansion of Holocaust commemoration, it does not fully explain it.

Other conflicts have been commemorated well before any dwindling of social memory, as Peter Novick (2000) writes of Vietnam, for example, and as can be seen for World War I and other aspects of World War II. Neither do psychological nor psychoanalytic accounts provide adequate explanation. According to these, the trauma of the Holocaust was so great that its full recognition was 'repressed'

and could only be contemplated after time had passed and as direct memory was receding. As scholars such as Novick (2000) and Kansteiner (2002) have argued, however, such explanations ignore the fact that the Holocaust was usually not so much avoided as framed in different – historically and socially specific – terms. Immediately after the war, in many countries, as Novick writes of the US, 'the Holocaust was *historicised* – thought about and talked about as a terrible feature of the period that had ended with the defeat of Nazi Germany. The Holocaust had not, in the post-war years, attained transcendent status as the bearer of eternal truths or lessons that could be derived from contemplating it' (2000: 100). In Britain the historicisation of the Holocaust also fed in to a national redemptive allegory of Britain having overcome the Nazi evil. It was further allied with a Christianised discourse of forgiveness and a more general assumption that looking back at the horrors was psychologically unhealthy. In both West and East Germany too, there was a pervasive public discourse of 'moving on' as a healthy post-war response (Moeller 2003; Macdonald 2009). This is not to say that there was necessarily forgetting, however, for at the same time there were reminders in popular media, such as the 'flood of images' of concentration camps published in the press in the aftermath of war and local forms of commemoration (Moeller 2003; Gregor 2009), though this may not have been widely embedded in familial remembering (Kaschuba 2005; Welzer *et al.* 2002).

There was also war commemoration – of World Wars I and II – across most of Europe, in which commemoration of the Jewish Holocaust was subsumed under more general World War II commemoration. This, in turn, built upon World War I commemoration and in many European countries the two world wars were mostly commemorated together, with memorials often being adapted and extended (Rowlands 1999). In Germany, for example, the usual form of commemorative language was remembrance of 'the victims of Fascism', a category that also included others such as political objectors, as well as ordinary German soldiers who died in the war.[7] Even in Israel, the first official commemoration of the Holocaust did not begin until 14 years after the war (Levy and Sznaider 2002: 92) and it remained relatively marginal and ambivalent, regarded primarily as 'a reminder of helpless passivity typical of Jewish existence outside the sovereign space of the territorial state' (ibid.: 95) until the 1960s, when it was reshaped, in the relation to the Eichmann trial and Six-Day War to being regarded as 'the culmination of the history of anti-Semitism' (ibid.: 96).

While the broadcasting of the Eichmann trial around the world raised awareness of the Nazi genocide of Jews, it was not until the 1980s, and in some cases even later, that most European countries began any state-sponsored Holocaust commemoration. There were some more or less isolated efforts, primarily by Jewish groups, but these were generally small scale and sometimes foundered through lack of wider support. In the case of Britain, for example, in 1965 a group of Holocaust survivors was refused permission to take part in events at the Cenotaph to mark the twentieth anniversary of the end of the War –

a refusal which was endorsed by leading Jewish and Christian organisations; and in 1980 the erection of a Holocaust memorial next to the Cenotaph was also refused, though the placing of a small – and largely forgotten – memorial stone in Hyde Park was allowed (Kushner 1998: 230).

Language and the global-assemblage 'Holocaust'

It is worth noting here too that the term 'Holocaust' was little used prior to the late 1970s, when the US-produced mini-series *Holocaust* – which came to be broadcast in many European countries – popularised the term, it coming to be used by many who had not seen or even heard of the series, not only in English-speaking countries but also in most others (Levi and Rothberg 2003: 12). The French director, Claude Lanzmann's, extraordinary documentary, *Shoah,* first screened in 1985, also helped to disseminate the Hebrew term 'Shoah', which some regard as more appropriate than the Greek-rooted 'Holocaust', though it has not gained the same widespread currency.[8] Although both terms had historically been used for other atrocities, during the 1980s they became firmly preceded by the definite article to designate the organised murder of Jews during World War II. This had the effect too of marking out the Holocaust as a specific assemblage (see Chapter 1), with its own particular set of properties and momentum. This was, moreover, an increasingly 'global assemblage' (Collier and Ong 2005), constituted and reconstituted in different parts of the world with specific effects. It was materialised especially in a panoply of forms of museumisation, heritagisation and commemoration, as I discuss below.

Before turning to these, however, it is worth noting other linguistic terms and semantic shifts that have also become elements in the formation of the global Holocaust assemblage. Events that had previously been cast primarily in terms of conflict between nations, and of victory and defeat, were now characterised as being to do with the Holocaust, thus putting the overriding emphasis upon the victims of Nazi terror. This reframing, however, occurred alongside, as part of an interlinked set of mutually supporting elements, a change in what Novick describes as 'the attitude towards victimhood' (2000: 8). As he puts it, since the 1960s 'victimhood' has moved

> from a status all but universally despised to one often eagerly embraced. On the individual level, the cultural icon of the strong, silent hero is replaced by the vulnerable and verbose antihero. Stoicism is replaced as a prime value by sensitivity. Instead of enduring in silence, one lets it all hang out. The voicing of pain and outrage is alleged to be 'empowering' as well as therapeutic.
>
> (2000: 8)

This shift of victimhood from being a denigrated status of the powerless and abject to providing a potentially powerful platform for articulating grievance and

seeking redress, is part of a broader identity politics and discourse of 'exclusion', as discussed in the previous chapter.

In the case of Holocaust, the reclaiming of agency that it represents has been further articulated through an increased usage of the term 'survivors' rather than 'victims', and equivalents in various other languages. Beginning in the US in the 1980s, the use of the term 'survivor' was intended to foreground the fact and achievement of endurance rather than perpetuate an emphasis on helplessness. But it caused discomfort for some of those so reclassified because it accorded agency where they felt they had none and seemed to downgrade the status of those who did not survive.[9] This is perhaps partly why its adoption has been patchy. In Germany, for example, while the term *Überlebende* – survivor – is sometimes used, it is not as widespread as *Opfer* – a term that means both 'victim' and 'sacrifice', and whose dual connotation plays into Christianised notions of sacrifice to some higher good that are deeply problematic in this context (Rowlands 1999: 142; Thomas 1999: 201).

On the one hand, then, there has been a widely shared global discourse of Holocaust that incorporates many of the same semantic elements in different languages and contexts. At the same time, however, there are particular linguistic inflections and connotations that contribute to how it plays out in specific, often national, situations. This is the case too for more material elements of the Holocaust assemblage.

Holocaust heritage

The most visible sign in Memoryland Europe of the proliferation of the Holocaust assemblage is the number of Jewish museums that have opened since the 1980s. Unlike the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC, which opened in 1981 and was followed by a continuing wave of Holocaust museums throughout the US, most of these prefer to characterise themselves as *Jewish* museums, giving a broader presentation of Jewish life in Europe prior, and in some cases subsequent, to its decimation in the mid-twentieth century. In Germany, Frankfurt's Jewish Museum opened in 1988, Berlin's in 2001 and that of Munich in 2007; and at least 10 further Jewish museums, as well as related sites such as synagogues showing exhibitions, have opened over this period.[10] Other new Jewish museums in Europe include the Jewish Museum of Lithuania, Vilnius (1989);[11] the Jewish Museum of Belgium, Brussels (1990);[12] the Slovak Museum of Jewish Culture, Bratislava (1991);[13] Greece's Jewish Museum, Athens (1998);[14] the Galicia Jewish Museum in Cracow, Poland (2004);[15] the Jewish Museum of Rome (2004);[16] the Danish Jewish Museum, Copenhagen, designed by Daniel Libeskind, opened in 2004; and the Jewish Museum in Oslo in 2008.[17] A Museum of the History of Polish Jews will open in Warsaw in 2013.[18]

It should be noted that some of Europe's Jewish Museums have a longer history, as does that of Vienna, originally founded in 1896; the Czech Jewish

FIGURE 8.1 Jewish Museum, Berlin. Photograph by Sharon Macdonald

Museum in Prague, founded in 1906; the Jewish Historical Museum, Amsterdam (1932)[19] and London's Jewish Museum, founded in 1932.[20] But these too have all been variously supplemented, renovated and expanded in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Vienna's Jewish Museum was closed by the Nazis in 1938, after the annexation of Austria; and some of its collections were shown for a while during the 1960s by the city's Jewish community but without any state support. Then, in the 1990s a Jewish Museum was founded and opened in 1993 in Dorotheergasse. This was refurbished in 1996 – introducing its controversial holograms exhibition (see below, and Bunzl 2003); and supplemented by a further new Jewish Museum in Judenplatz in 2000, which itself underwent considerable refurbishment in 2010.[21] Currently, the Dorotheergasse Jewish Museum is being refurbished again (its holograms exhibition having been dismantled).[22] The Czech Jewish Museum was closed to the public in 1938 but from 1942 the Nazis added items from around Europe to its collections with the sinister aim of creating what they planned would become a 'museum of an extinct race'.[23] Today, Prague's Jewish Museum consists of a set of sites around the city, several of which were opened in the 1990s.[24] The Amsterdam Jewish Historical Museum was thoroughly renewed and relocated in 1987.[25] London saw the opening of the new London Museum of Jewish Life in 1983, which amalgamated institutionally with the earlier Jewish Museum in 1995, and became part of a new, single building in 2010.[26]

FIGURE 8.2 Queues of visitors at one of the sites of Prague's Jewish Museum. Photograph by Sharon Macdonald



FIGURE 8.3 Holocaust memorial Vienna, by Rachel Whiteread. Photograph by Sharon Macdonald

As well as museums, Europe has seen a massive wave of Holocaust memorials. This includes well-known examples such as Rachel Whiteread's 'inverted library' memorial in Vienna, unveiled in 2000, and the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin, unveiled in 2005. It also includes numerous smaller memorials, such as plaques on houses of former Jewish citizens; and the thought-provoking 'counter-monuments', of artists such as Horst Hoheisel and Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz, that seek to resist the stasis of many memorials and thus to avoid the paradoxical forgetting that some suggest is a consequence of much memorialisation (Young 1993, 2000). This commemorative activity has been accompanied by the growth of touristic production of Jewish heritage, such as that in Poland – including *Schindler's List* tours in Krakow – since the late 1990s,[27] and a wave of signs of what Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (1999), in the German context, has described as a shift in the 'memory landscape' (*Erinnerungslandschaft*). These include the opening of Jewish restaurants and courses in Jewish Studies (the latter being, she notes, now more popular – overwhelmingly with non-Jewish Germans – at the University of Munich than is Gender Studies). As Ruth Ellen Gruber puts it in her lively documentation of what she calls 'the Jewish phenomenon' – a pan-European embracing of 'Things Jewish' is underway.

> From Milan to Munich, from Krakow to Cluj and well beyond, Jewish exhibitions, festivals and workshops of all types abound, as do conferences and academic study programmes on all aspects of Jewish history, culture, and tradition. Readings, lectures, seminars, talk shows and films spotlight Jewish issues; and articles and programs on Jewish subjects are being given frequent and prominent space in the print-media and on prime-time television. Private volunteers and civic organizations clean up abandoned Jewish cemeteries and place plaques on empty synagogues … Yiddish song, klezmer (traditional eastern European Jewish instrumental music), and other Jewish music – performed by Jewish and non-Jewish groups alike – draw enthusiastic (and overwhelmingly non-Jewish) audiences to concert halls, churches, clubs and outdoor arenas. Hundreds – even thousands – of new books on Jewish topics are published in local languages … Old Jewish quarters are under development as tourist attractions, where 'Jewish-style' restaurants with 'Jewish-sounding' names write their signs in Hebrew or Hebrew-style letters, use Jewish motifs in their décor, and name their dishes – sometimes even dishes made from pork or a nonkosher mix of meat and dairy products – after rabbis and Old Testament prophets.
>
> (Gruber 2002: 6)

Again, while this is frequently depicted as being about 'Jewish culture' rather than the Holocaust, the two cannot be disentangled in post-Holocaust Europe. This is made particularly and ironically evident by the fact that the embracing of Things Jewish is so frequently carried out by non-Jews in contexts in which, due to the Holocaust, only few and sometimes no Jews now live.

FIGURE 8.4 Jewish figurines for sale in Krakow. Photograph courtesy of Erica Lehrer

This is evident, for example, in Erica Lehrer's detailed account of a trade in carved wooden figurines of old-fashioned Jews – 'all men, traditionally coiffed and black-coated', with melancholic expressions (2003: 336; 2013). Produced for the expanded tourist market by non-Jewish Poles, they traffic in a stereotype that might be deemed anti-Semitic, not least in its depiction of Jews as part of a *past* that is incongruous with modernity. Yet, she argues, numerous different affects and identifications circulate around and through these souvenirs, resisting uni-dimensional explanations.[28] Some of their makers claim that they create them as a memorial duty, atoning for post-Holocaust Jewish absence; 'It is my aim not to let traces of this ancient culture sink into oblivion', said one carver (2003: 346). While this might seem disingenuous from somebody who produces them for sale en masse, others too – including Jews – may see it in similar ways. One Jewish woman from the US, owner of a substantial collection of the figurines, explained:

> 'The real significance for me, and why I was so drawn to them ... was that I felt they were a symbol, just sitting there, that Judaism would never die no matter what happened. That here in the midst of all this destruction that you saw, with few Jews left, that sitting in a market were these dolls ... That's really what it is for me. That no matter how many times you try to put the Jews down, they pop up somewhere'.
>
> (2003: 321–2)

Lehrer's research is an important reminder of the multiple and also transnational motivations that may be entangled in the growth of Holocaust heritage – even in its most apparently kitschy forms.

Explaining the Holocaust phenomenon

To some extent, the new level of public marking of the Holocaust can be seen as part of a more general public preoccupation with the past that has taken off since the 1970s and that has been discussed in previous chapters. Yet many of the arguments typically used to try to explain this do not work for the case of Holocaust remembrance. This is clearly no nostalgic looking back to a time of tradition, community or greater stability. World War and Holocaust highlight precariousness and violence, even – or, as Bauman (1989) argues, especially – in the midst of modernity and rationalisation. While there is an element of recuperating the voices of those whose experiences have been left out of many historical accounts – in this case the victims/survivors – this is not all there is to it, and it does not explain the state-sponsorship of commemorative activity in most countries, nor the form that much Holocaust commemoration takes.

In his discussion of growing public discourse of Holocaust in the US, Peter Novick (2000) shows a detailed interweaving of activity by American Jews – including growing fears of losing their identity in the face of *reduced* evident anti-Semitism in the States – and wider events, including the Eichmann trials and the altered discourse of victimhood, which changed the frameworks within which the events of the 1930s and 1940s were talked about. What Novick dubs an increased 'Holocaust fixation' (2000: 10) in the US also had consequences for Europe, not least through the growth of American Holocaust-related tourism to Europe (e.g. Kugelmass 1992; Cole 2000). For the European case, Ruth Ellen Gruber also emphasises not simply generational change and concern over the disappearance of direct witnesses but also attention to questions of wartime activity and culpability raised by the '68er generation, especially in West Germany (2002: 15). In Eastern Europe, a 'waning of communism' also made filling what were perceived as the 'blanks' of history – dimensions ignored under communism – a moral project of self-definition, in which Jewish history became one such 'blank' to be recovered (2002: 18). In addition, she attributes the development of a more sympathetic Christian view of Jews to the 1965 *Nostra Aetate* Second Vatican declaration that withdrew the former attribution of Jewish collective responsibility for the murder of Jesus, and to Polish Pope John Paul II's attempts to build bridges with Judaism, stemming partly from his own wartime experiences (2002: 18). Furthermore, she suggests, Jews' own attempts to redefine their identities, partly in light of some of the events above, has also resulted in a turn to 'roots and heritage' (2002: 18).

As Gruber acknowledges, this turn is also part of a wider pan-European interest in heritage. And while there are significant differences from that wider heritage phenomenon, as noted above, there are also elements that are shared. In

particular, both rest on and, in a feedback loop, help to sustain the increasingly widespread assumption that the past deserves attention in the present and that it can provide lessons for the future. Indeed, the Holocaust has become a key constitutive case in the widespread positioning of history as an educational resource for the present and future. Despite the fact that it has been subject to extensive debate (especially but not only in the famous Historians' Debate (*Historikerstreit)* in Germany in the 1980s (Maier 1987)) over whether or not it should be regarded as so singular as to be unable to provide analogies with other events, it has nevertheless become the basis for numerous educational programmes across Europe.[29] These attempt to operationalise the principle of *Never again!* – a phrase that became widespread in the wake of World War II (initially with reference to war) and later more specifically in relation to Holocaust. By providing awareness of the horror of the Holocaust, educational programmes aim to help prevent future atrocity. Involved here too is not just an idea that the past is capable of providing lessons for the present and future but that there is a moral duty to look to history for such lessons. This understanding of the past as a source for moral witnessing and debate is a key feature of the late twentieth- and twenty-first century heritage and memory phenomenon that this book explores. World War II and the Holocaust – events that ravaged Europe and beyond, destroying and disrupting millions of lives – surely played a central role in shaping this particular perspective on the past.

This 'take' on history is one that we could readily consider to be a form of 'cosmopolitan memory'. Rather than history being understood as about *specific* pasts, it is plumbed as a source for 'bigger' and 'broader' 'lessons'. It is 'lifted out' of its particular settings and put to work in others. Yet, as has also been evident from earlier chapters in this book, there is much else that may be entailed in past presencing in practice. In what follows, I discuss both the specific phenomenon of Holocaust commemoration and cosmopolitan memory arguments through a set of examples drawn primarily from anthropological research. This not only provides a more fine-grained examination of what is underway 'on the ground' in particular and differentiated contexts, it also highlights other considerations, limits and paradoxes that may be involved and that theorising needs to address.

Ritual commemoration of the Holocaust

Commemorative ceremonies and ritual deserve attention as distinctive memorial forms. While these frequently occur at monumental sites, they also have a specific character as collective activity of condensed symbolic significance (Turner 1967). Individuals come together to participate in more or less choreographed actions, that contain at least some shared movements, and that are recognised as being meaningful for collective identity. This does not require that individuals need to decode the particular meanings of actions or symbols employed – indeed elements of ritual are not necessarily de-codable in this way, though they often reference other ceremonies or rituals in an inter-rituality analogous to inter-

textuality. Especially important, however, are ritual's performative dimensions – in two senses of the term 'performative'. First, the classic Austinian sense, in analogy with speech acts that accomplish what they utter – e.g. 'I promise' (Austin 1962a; see also Butler 1997). A national ritual, for example, in this sense of performative would not be interpreted as merely *expressing* the nation but as bringing the nation into being. Second, a ritual is performative also in the sense of being a form of performance, analogous with that of theatre, in which matters such as staging, scripts, props, actors and audience all contribute to the making of a specific, affectively rich, event. This form of performance is partly what makes ritual performative in the first sense.

While rituals and ceremonies are generally held at designated monuments or sites, they do not operate the same temporality as do monuments and sites. Typically the temporality of ritual and ceremony is both punctuated (i.e. at designated time-limited moments) and repetitive, often along annual cycles in the case of national ceremonies. As Émile Durkheim (1912) argued, this may have an 'effervescent' effect, re-imbuing the social with affect and significance. Due to the non-material nature of ceremonies, however, changes are usually fairly easy to introduce, meaning that even while rituals may repeat, they can respond to context and contingency, resulting in variations over time. Likewise, despite collective action, the fact that much is left verbally unarticulated in ritual may allow for divergences of interpretation, as argued in Victor Turner's classic account (1967), as well as in more recent analyses of ritualised memorial practices (e.g. Sturken 1997; Handelman 1998; Michaels and Wulf 2011).

Below I turn to two examples of Holocaust commemorative ritual – the first a 'life-cycle' ritual by Israeli citizens to Holocaust death camps in Europe; and the second, the UK's first Holocaust Memorial Day in 2001. In both, I am concerned with how far ritualised public Holocaust commemoration 'cracks the container' of the nation state and offers cosmopolitan potential.

Nationalism in Israeli Holocaust commemoration in Poland

Trips by young Israelis to Polish death camps can be seen as 'a central rite … in Israel's civil religion' (Feldman 2002: 85), according to Jackie Feldman. Run since the 1980s, these organised trips have now taken hundreds of thousands of young Israelis on visits to Auschwitz-Birkenau and other camps. As Feldman describes, this practice is highly nationalistic, instilling strong and embodied, emotional senses of national identity through collective participation in ritualised activity (2002, 2008). As such, it clearly does not fit the cosmopolitan memory thesis. Because Levy and Sznaider put so much emphasis on mediated forms of memory, he argues, they 'underestimate the power of rituals and embodied practices to create coherent, totalistic local worlds of meaning' (Feldman 2008: 260). Moreover, far from disappearing or being displaced by mediated memory, such embodied ritual remains important. Nations in particular, maintains Feldman, continue to use ritual in this way, thus 'ground[ing] their ontology in

FIGURE 8.5 A ceremony at the Warsaw Ghetto (Rapaport) Memorial, Auschwitz. The Memorial, one of the very few depicting Jewish heroism, is framed as the transition and re-entry point from the Holocaust to Israel. The ceremony, generally performed immediately before boarding the bus for the airport and the voyage home, appropriates the site and the legacy of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising for the State. Photograph and caption courtesy of Jackie Feldman

FIGURE 8.6 Students line up to photograph each other by the *Arbeit Macht Frei* gate at Auschwitz. As students' albums are one of the main means of transmission of their testimony to others, the snapshots form part of the bank of images that will shape future participants' understandings of the Shoah and their expectations of the voyage. Photograph and caption courtesy of Jackie Feldman

traditional religion-based paradigms and embodied practices' (ibid.); and they further support this through a 'deploy[ment of] cultural history in service of the State' (ibid.). 'In other words', he concludes, 'reports of nationalism's death – and the victory of secularization – have been premature' (2008: 260).

Not only does Feldman's research show how Holocaust commemoration can act in service of nationalistic sentiments, it also provides a basis for criticising some of Levy and Sznaider's other assumptions. In particular, he argues that the proliferation of mediated forms of memory and the increased international traffic of people can support rather than diminish nationalism. As he explains: 'The permeability of national boundaries, the ease and relative affordability of travel, and the ability to diffuse knowledge of the voyages through mass media all enable the State to promote voyages to the dead Diaspora as a source of stable roots in the state' (2008: 260). Videos and photographs of the events enable those who have been on such visits to Poland to tell others about it, and circulate this information – and their accompanying sentiments – more widely. Moreover, Feldman argues, cosmopolitan ideas make it difficult to oppose nationalistic activity. Even when Israel engages in highly nationalistic acts, such as raising the Israeli flag during the visits in 'rituals closely resembling those of the cult of fallen soldiers' (2008: 260), Poles are rendered unable to object because 'the very recognition of the cosmopolitan (or inter-European) significance of the Holocaust makes [them] loath to openly confront Israel over the extremely nationalist (and often anti-Polish) tenor of the voyages' (2008: 260).

The UK's first Holocaust Memorial Day

That the UK government created a major new national ceremony and sponsored thousands of smaller commemorative rituals and events across the country to mark its first Holocaust Memorial Day in 2001 can also be seen as evidence of the continued importance that nations may put on ritualised activity.[30] The capacities of technical mediation were put to use here too, the new ceremony being broadcast on prime-time television. This too, however, was in service of the nation, as indicated among other things by the fact that the ceremony was attended by numerous 'national figures', including the Prime Minister and Prince Charles. Nevertheless, as I argue in my detailed analysis of the context and structure of, and debate about, the new national commemoration, while the event was thoroughly *national,* it was also a performative bid to configure the nation in a new way (Macdonald 2005a). While not directly framed in terms of arguments about cosmopolitanism, my account of the UK's first Holocaust Memorial Day showed on the one hand that this was no 'breaking of the national container'. On the other, however, it showed an attempt to revise the nation itself *as* cosmopolitan.

In numerous ways throughout the planning and instantiation of the new UK Holocaust Memorial Day, the nation was referenced both directly and also indirectly through the more implicit ways that Michael Billig refers to

as 'banal' (1995; and see below). At times, this drew directly on the imagery of Britain as 'war hero' that Kushner argues is 'central to post-1945 national identity' (Kushner 1997: 10; see also Cesarani 1997). For example, the national ceremony included a film about the Bergen-Belsen camp being liberated by British troops, and another about children being brought to Britain via the Czech Kindertransport; and throughout, there was emphasis on survivors of the Holocaust and other atrocities seeking, and gaining, refuge in Britain.[31] The 'national' character of the event even trumped its potential Jewishness. As Gaby Koppel, responsible for producing the inaugural national ceremony, put it: 'we were very clear about one thing. Holocaust Memorial Day wasn't to be an event just for Jews. It was a national occasion, relevant to all British citizens' (Koppel 2001: 7).

The Holocaust was, then, 'lifted out' of a specific Jewish reference – or, in terms used earlier in this book, given greater 'semantic reach'. This was not just with reference to the diverse population of Britain, however. In addition, other parts of the world were also reached out to through reference to other atrocities, including in Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda, all of which were included in the televised national ceremony. While this was a clear cosmopolitanising move in Levy and Sznaider's sense, the nation remained intact. Indeed, in some ways it was strengthened. It was so through the repeated referencing of the country as an actor (e.g. 'Britain's role in …') and use of the first-person plural pronoun (e.g. 'our country…'), thus taking the nation's existence, agency and a collective citizenly subscription to it for granted. The nation was also strengthened by being cast as hero; through modes such as reports from refugees in Britain, reference to Britain's military role in trying to resolve ongoing conflicts, and analogies implied with Britain's role in World War II.

The depiction of Britain as a haven for those escaping persecution also, however, served to support a portrait of Britain as multicultural. This was an explicit government aim, stated in the Government Proposal for a Holocaust Remembrance Day, published in October 1999. The proposal only mentions Jews in order to emphasise that the Holocaust should not be regarded as concerning them alone: 'Although it was a tragedy whose primary focus was the Jewish people, many other groups were persecuted and it has implications for us all' (Home Office 1999: 2). The proposal goes on to spell out those implications, and the kind of Britain that the Home Office hopes the new ceremony could help support:

> The Government has a clear vision of a multi-cultural Britain – one which values the contribution made by each of our many ethnic, cultural and faith communities. We are determined to see a truly dynamic society, in which people from different backgrounds can live and work together, whilst retaining their distinctive identities, in an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding.
>
> (Home Office 1999: 1)

This 'vision' was also dramatised in the national ceremony in acts such as citizens of visibly different ethnicities and faiths coming together to light candles of remembrance. Depicting the nation itself as cosmopolitan – as open to different cultures and traditions – was, then, a central ambition of the new Holocaust commemoration.

It was not, however, without its contradictions and ironies. On the one hand, for example, the official rhetoric was of Britain working together with other European nations in commemorating the Holocaust. This was prompted in part by the Stockholm Forum on the Holocaust of 2000, which had spurred various other nations (including Sweden and Italy) to also begin new Holocaust Memorial Days; and that was part of a wider European concern over the Balkan wars and growing racism and anti-Semitism.[32] Yet, at the same time, the national ceremony contained representation of World War II in the form of what Kushner describes as the 'Britain alone myth' (1997: 10), in which Britain is depicted as separate from the rest of Europe and even as a solitary adversary of Germany. Some commentators also pointed out that the cosmopolitan rhetoric of openness to difference, and specifically the projection of Britain as a place of refuge, was contrary to aspects of the country's asylum and immigration legislation and practice (Yuval-Davis and Silverman 2002). Furthermore, the new commemoration was itself the basis for inter-cultural dispute, the Muslim Council of Britain refusing in 2002 to take part in the commemoration in protest at Israel's occupation of Palestine (Macdonald 2005a; Werbner 2009).[33]

What these ironies of practice showed was that while cosmopolitan aspirations worked well when safely removed from their specific context – i.e. when 'the Holocaust' operated as a generalisable case of the perpetration of evil – they could founder when reinserted into *Realpolitik*. More widely, the new ceremony showed the risk that the very premise of the Holocaust as 'offering lessons' could easily be transformed into a sacrificial trope of movement towards a higher end – as when Prime Minister, Tony Blair, commented: 'Let not one life sacrificed in the Holocaust be in vain'.[34] As Michael Rowlands points out, this trope is deeply inappropriate to the case of the Holocaust, in relation to which 'nobody can claim that the deaths served any purpose whatsoever' (1999: 142).

National identity dilemmas

Part of my argument in my analysis of the UK's first Holocaust Memorial Day was that some of the main ways in which national identities have been constructed historically have become increasingly problematic. As various theorists have argued, this typically involves processes of opposition – of defining 'us' in relation to 'them' (e.g. Jenkins 1997); with this then consolidated by identifying content that can be taken as marking 'Us-ness' and constructing differentiating symbols and what in German are called '*Gegenbilder*' (counterimages) (Beck-Gernsheim 1999). In the production of nation-states there seem to be two

oppositional tendencies involved. One is externally-oriented: self-definition in relation to other nations, e.g. British versus French. War has always been one of the most fertile arenas for this kind of definitional activity, though it also goes on in more 'banal' ways, such as sport or media discussions of food (Billig 1995). The other means is internally-oriented: the identification of, say, the 'really Us/British', through contrast with the 'not-Us/not-British', within (e.g. Gilroy 1987). In the histories of all modern nation-states we can see the identification of 'out-groups' within, which serves to foster and maintain a majority identity in relation to the minority, and also processes such as the scapegoating of these minorities as sources of blame for the fact that the nation-state does not achieve the perfection to which it aspires. Nazi Germany is, of course, the most striking example of this, Jews being the principal 'Other' in this process. But the very overt and state-perpetrated way in which this process occurred in Germany should not obscure the fact that the same basic process has been at work in identity formation in other nation-states too.

In a world of increased international dependency, global communication, trade and supra-national organisations, self-definition contra other nations has become less politic – though it still goes on. Post-Holocaust and in contexts of greater ethnic and cultural mixing, and sometimes vociferous identity-politics, self-definition by majorities through opposition to minorities has also become less politic, not least because minorities may be crucial in electoral terms – though it too still goes on. What is more acceptable, however, is self-definition in relation to the past. This can take the form of seeking continuities, though today these are less likely to take the straightforward triumphalist form of earlier national narratives (Samuel 1998; Phillips 1998). They can also operate oppositionally, either through contrast with a past self (as in contemporary Germany; or as witnessed in apologies for past events); or through contrast with past adversaries (though this risks being conflated with the present). Holocaust commemoration in Britain, for example, makes a contrast between Britain and Nazi Germany, and also other countries that perpetrate atrocities; and also seeks to evoke a sense of continuity with a time that is popularly seen as one when Britain was strong, people 'pulled together', shared common values, and exhibited 'moral backbone'. This potential that the past offers for different – and usually safer – kinds of identity-formation is, I suggest, a significant element in the wider turn to public history and heritage.

A cosmopolitan battle in Denmark?

One context in which strong 'us' versus 'them' national oppositions are typically made is that of war. For this reason, battles have frequently had important roles in national history, especially those that marked victories of the nation over enemies that threatened its national sovereignty. In some circumstances, however, defeats can also become part of a nation's history by acting as moments from which the nation rallied and projected itself into the future – though here

too oppositional national identity-construction as well as continuity-making is at work. The 1864 Battle of Dybbøl is just such an iconic 'noble defeat' in Danish national history, as Mads Daugbjerg (2009, 2011, 2013) describes. An event in which Denmark was defeated by Prussia and lost considerable land to what later became Germany, it nevertheless is often celebrated as the symbolic 'cradle of the "pure" Danish nation' (Daugbjerg 2011: 245), from which modern Denmark was born. Dybbøl, and especially the annual commemorative ceremonies that mark the battle, has also been the focus for considerable anti-German sentiment in Denmark.[35]

In his in-depth research at the battle site in 2006–7 however, Daugbjerg witnessed a series of interesting attempts to revise the commemorative ceremonies and the battlefield heritage centre to play down Danish nationalism and to try to be more conciliatory towards Germans and Germany. In 2001, German soldiers were invited for the first time to take part in the annual commemorative ceremony, marching and laying wreaths alongside the Danish military. The representations at the battlefield centre were also altered in order to emphasise stories of ordinary experience and shared human hardship rather than to focus on aggression between warring states. All this, writes Daugbjerg, was an explicit attempt to be 'non-national', 'post-heroic' (2011: 249) or 'cosmopolitan' (2009, 2011, 2012). The national was played down in favour of 'universal humanitarian ideals' (2011: 249).

Yet, as his detailed research shows, these attempts to 'not mention the nation' (2011) did not fully succeed. This was partly because, although the nation was mentioned less frequently in explicit terms, it was nevertheless subtly reasserted in 'banal' ways. Here, he draws on Billig's argument (1995) that nations are 'flagged' in everyday interactions through subtle means, such as *deixis* – a process in which the nation is implied (for example through linguistic reference, such as to 'our newspapers') without being explicitly named. A nice example of this in Daugbjerg's account is how in the Dybbøl heritage centre the verbal content of an audio-visual guide was altered to include more Prussian perspectives and to create what was regarded as 'a more balanced view on the war' (2011: 257). However, the audio-visual's background soundtrack, which consisted of a well-known nationalistic, martial song (whose lyrics and metaphors have been mobilised in recent years by the anti-immigrant Danish People's Party), remained unchanged. As Daugbjerg observes, visitors could sometimes be heard whistling this tune around the site after visiting the centre (2011: 257). Explicitly excised, the nation thus remained implicitly in place.

On the basis of this research, then, Daugbjerg cautions against readily accepting arguments about the nation being superseded by cosmopolitan reframing of memory. The nation is difficult to dislodge as it is subtly reasserted in banal interactions. Moreover, as I have argued for the UK case, there is also sometimes an attempt to recast the nation as cosmopolitan, witnessed in a 'conflation of cosmopolitan and national values' (2009: 443) and '"universal" values [being] celebrated as quintessentially Danish' (2009: 442).

FIGURE 8.7 Dybbøl ceremony 2006, including both Danish and (on the right-hand side) German soldiers. Photograph courtesy of Mads Daugbjerg

Incorporating Jews in the New Europe

The cases discussed above, then, variously show a persistence – and sometimes even a performance and strengthening – of the nation in what might potentially be cosmopolitan commemorative contexts. At the same time, however, some provide evidence for a reconfiguration of the nation itself as more 'multicultural' and cosmopolitan. Just how this plays out, however, is at least partly 'reflexively particular' within specific national contexts.

Matti Bunzl's discussion of the growth and form of Holocaust commemoration in Austria (2003, 2004) is also interesting in this regard, for he both shows Austria's distinctive position as well as offering a more general argument about changes underway in Europe. In relation to World War II, Austria has long regarded itself as victim of German aggression. From the 1980s, however, this self-image has increasingly been questioned, especially in light of President Kurt Waldheim's wartime activities in the Nazi *Wehrmacht* and his subsequent right-wing affiliations and the success of the Right Wing Freedom Party in Austria in the late 1990s. This, argues Bunzl (2003), played a part in a considerable expansion of public marking of Jewish heritage in the 1990s, which included the Jewish Museum developments noted above, with the contentious holograms exhibition that is the starting point for Bunzl's discussion.

Bunzl's argument is that while Jews historically 'were abjected as the nation's constitutive Other' (2003: 436), the expansion of Jewish heritage and a wider

visibility of Jewishness in the public sphere in late 1990s Austria is evidence of their inclusion. He notes that even Jörg Haider's Freedom Party began to use more positive rhetoric towards Jews during the 1990s, going so far as to elect a member of Vienna's Jewish community to a leadership position in the Party (2003: 455). This inclusion, which operates across the political spectrum, is, according to Bunzl, a function of the nation-state's being superseded by 'Europe', and thus a performance of new, European rather than national, boundaries. Jews, he writes, 'have become useful in Austria and elsewhere for the postmodern constitution of a European Self effected through the violent exclusion of a new set of Others – Muslims and Africans foremost among them' (2003: 436; 2005; see also Bangstad and Bunzl 2010). The holograms exhibition in the Jewish Museum is, he suggests, a rare and brave attempt to de-reify the Jewishness that is generally essentialised in public life (2003: 457) – in the new incorporation of Jews as much as in their earlier exclusion. The widespread negative reactions to it, however, speak to the investments in what he calls the 'cultural normalization of Jews' (2003: 457). Whether the closure of the holograms exhibition in the Dorotheergasse Jewish Museum signals a final victory of 'cultural normalisation' will depend on what kind of exhibition comes to replace it.[36]

What Bunzl's argument suggests for the cosmopolitan memory thesis is that there does indeed seem to be Europeanisation underway and that a focus on Holocaust plays a constitutive part in this. However, rather than this being necessarily a positive cosmopolitan development, it is part of a new set of exclusions and the creation of Europe not as 'open to the world' but as 'Fortress Europe' (see also Gingrich and Banks 2006). It is also worth noting here, echoing arguments above, that actual practice may also diverge from public rhetoric. While there is a public performance of incorporation of Jews in the New Europe, this does not necessarily mean full or unequivocal incorporation in everyday life. Ruth Mandel's *Cosmopolitan Anxieties* (2008), for example, gives sensitive attention to numerous, often subtle, exclusions or demarcations of Jews as Other – including analogies drawn between Jews and Turks – even amidst the 'Jewish renaissance' underway in Berlin since the 1980s. Furthermore, there may be divergence from the moves towards incorporation when it comes to particular groups of Jews. In Germany, for example, there is often considerable ambivalence towards the Russian Jews who have significantly increased the country's Jewish population since 1990 (Peck 2006: 40), and who, as Jeffrey Peck notes, are 'widely regarded as merely using their real or supposed Jewishness to get out of the Soviet Union for a better life in the West' (2006: 44; see also Bodemann and Bagno 2008). In contrast to the Jewishness being recovered from the past and enshrined in heritage, actually existing Russian Jews – who often do not go to synagogue or follow kosher rules – may fail to live up to the kind of Jewishness that the 'renaissance' has been bringing into being (Beck-Gernsheim 1999: 153–6).

So far, this chapter has looked especially at the linked rise of Holocaust heritage and Jewish renaissance in Europe. In some cases at least, this rise

appears to be linked to Europeanisation and a reconfiguration of the nation as more culturally diverse and open to difference. At the same time, however, in most of these cases the nation remains an active player, and in some seems to be strengthened rather than merely 'being remembered in order to overcome it' (Beck, Levy and Sznaider 2009: 125), as Levy and Sznaider suppose. In the next section, I explore the cosmopolitan memory thesis further through a different set of ethnographic examples that are all concerned in various ways with the Balkan wars and attempts at post-war memory reconstruction.

Overcoming national sentiments in the post-war Balkans?

The Balkan wars of the 1990s are widely regarded as a resurgence of the kind of dangerous ethnic and nationalistic sentiments that it had been hoped that greater cosmopolitanisation, Europeanisation and memory of the Holocaust would prevent. That some of the atrocities of the Balkan wars came to be framed in international media through language referencing the Holocaust – with accompanying images of 'concentration camps' – was a clear mobilisation of Holocaust memory (Levy and Sznaider 2004: 153). In turn, this helped to mobilise NATO intervention and for the first time Germany participated militarily to help end ethnic cleansing. The analogy – and 'never again' motif – has also been deployed since in various attempts to 'repair' the region through numerous Europeanisation projects of various kinds. These seek to promote some kind of cosmopolitan or European identity in order to reduce ethnic and national affiliations. More widely, discourses of cosmopolitanism and of being European have been and continue to be used in popular discourse by certain groups. This does not necessarily mean, however, that these result in all of the cosmopolitan characteristics that cosmo-optimistic normative accounts, such as those of Beck, Levy and Sznaider, might hope, as we will see in the following ethnographic studies from the post-war Balkans.

Cosmonostalgia and closures

In fieldwork in post-war Belgrade and Zagreb, Stef Jansen (2009) encountered an explicit discourse of cosmopolitanism, employed by 'antinationalists'. These were individuals, usually fairly well educated, who were very critical of the nationalism that had fuelled the war. The term *kozmopolit* (or synonyms of it) was used to describe life in the cities as they had been before the conflicts arose and that anti-nationalists hoped would be restored. A student banner of the late 1990s, *Beograd is the World,* for example, expressed 'at once the city's worldliness and the desire to end isolation from "the World"' (2009: 84). What was meant by 'the World' here was 'the liberal democracies of the West' (ibid.). On the one hand, then, a cosmopolitan outlook was deployed to articulate anti-nationalist sentiments. But as Jansen points out, it was neither as future-oriented nor as straightforwardly 'open' as cosmopolitan theorising tends to expect – or hope.

Rather, references to Belgrade and Zagreb as cosmopolitan were deeply nostalgic – harking back to a pre-war 'normality'. While on the one hand they entailed an opening to the West in order to end a sense of isolation from it, at the same time cosmopolitanism was frequently articulated as a quality of the *city* in contrast to the 'primitivism' of rural life. This could be seen, as Anna Di Lellio and Stephanie Schwander-Sievers argue of Albania in the aftermath of the Balkan conflict, as a form of 'internal "nesting Orientalism"' in which 'city dwellers … look … down on the "backward" peasants of the villages, transferring to them the stereotypical generalisations of "backwardness" ascribed to all Albanians in the dominating mental maps of the former Yugoslavia' (Di Lellio and Schwander-Sievers 2006: 522). As such, maintains Jansen for his Balkan subjects, what was produced in cosmopolitan discourse was not so much an 'openness' to the other, as 'alternative closures' – 'between cities and villages, between citizens and peasants, between open, nationally heterogeneous, modern, urban life and closed, nationally homogeneous, backward, rural life' (2009: 84). In effect, what this also did was to curtail the openness to cultural and national difference that is normally seen as part of a cosmopolitan outlook. The celebration of this particular kind of urban cosmopolitanism, he suggests, ironically produced a 'flattening [of] the cultural-national differences it was programmatically open to, through emphasising (in this case, urban) sameness across its boundaries' (2009: 90). In other words, the kind of cosmopolitanism in practice here operated on the one hand to create a hierarchical boundary between the city and the rural, in which the difference of the latter was denigrated; and on the other to downplay – or close itself off towards – other kinds of difference.

History and heritage in post-war reconciliation

In the aftermath of the Balkan wars, many international organisations have been involved in various forms of 'repair work', and these have often involved organised attempts at 'memory management' (Sorabji 2006). In some cases this has involved 'intervening in the process of transgenerational transmission of trauma' (Sorabji 2006: 2) in order to encourage people to 'put the past behind them' and to 'move forward'. This is often modelled on the psychoanalytically informed idea of 'working through' traumatic memories as a means of avoiding being 'haunted' by them in the future. In other cases, or other memory management programmes, however, there have been other strategies too. In Albania, Di Lellio and Schwander-Sievers (2006) argue that the international authorities have sought to foster a 'collective amnesia', by discouraging reference to the past or dismissing it as folklore, in the service of '"resetting" … to a timeless present of multi-ethnic tolerance' (2006: 526). As they show, however, this does not find compliance in a society in which historical recollection and narration are viewed as an integral part of life and, in effect, identity. The compulsion to tell 'stories' about the past is, they suggest, like a secular version of the Jewish *zakhor* – the religious prescription to transmit Jewish history to future

generations (2006: 526; Yerushalmi 1982). Moreover, in such 'story-telling', 'the storyteller and historian are the same person' and 'history, legend and personal memories are mixed' (2006: 526).

Not only does this mean that organised efforts to encourage 'collective amnesia' are unlikely to succeed, it also helps maintain strong national and nationalist myth-making in the post-war period. The significance of this myth-making for local people is typically overlooked or underestimated by the international authorities who classify it as folklore. Di Lellio and Schwander-Sievers show this well through their account of how Adem Jashari, an Albanian rebel leader killed fighting against Serbian troops in 1998, has become a cult figure, memorialised at a memorial complex established at the bombed remains of houses where his family perished, and also on postcards and other memorabilia. Involved in this, producing it and also further generated by it in a feedback loop, are the kinds of national collective identity and sentiments – which sustain calls for Kosovo as an independent country – that the international authorities had hoped to avoid. Di Lellio and Schwander-Sievers argue, then, that the approach of the international authorities has in some respects, paradoxically, allowed and even encouraged such nationalism through its strategies of collective amnesia. It is further aggravated by the authorities' associated refusal to address the historical specificity of the Kosovan and Albanian case, and their stance of 'not taking sides' and trying to 'keep a distance'.

Elsewhere in the post-war Balkans, there have been attempts to expressly deploy heritage as a means of trying to transcend national identifications, as Claske Vos (2011, 2012) shows in her analysis of the 'Regional programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage in South-East Europe' begun by the Council of Europe and the European Commission in 2003. Like various other programmes before it, this aimed to produce 'integrated rehabilitation' (2011: 225) by implementing various forms of 'Europeanisation'. As she explains, 'European heritage was presented as equal to the notion of a "shared European memory" that should unite all Europeans in an attempt to "never again" have a war on European territory' (2012: 4). She looks in particular at how it operated in practice in Serbia, where it was promoted as creating the possibility to 'revisit the memories of Serbia's European past', as a tourist brochure that she quotes puts it (2011: 222). Heritage in this instance, she suggests, was promoted as 'inherently "good"' – 'a cause for celebration', as Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett has also observed in relation to UNESCO world heritage (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006: 190; Vos 2011: 234). The quest to find 'good' heritage that would help in 'integrative rehabilitation' resulted, however, in an 'avoidance of difficult heritage' (2011: 234) and a general 'distancing from ideological meaning' both in the selection of sites and their presentation (2011: 236–7). So, for example, Muslim sites were excluded as 'too problematic'. This was supported and legitimated by a bureaucratic preference for short-term success, itself promoted by what were referred to as 'European' management practices. This indicated particular technical procedures, such as using 'pilot projects' as



FIGURE 8.8 Adem Jashari monument in Tirana. Photograph by Antidiskriminator at Wikimedia Commons

'test-cases' from which 'emblematic monuments and sites' would be selected (2011: 228–9). As Vos shows, 'difficult heritage' would not only have been less assured of success according to the programme's model, it would also have proved more challenging and time-consuming to address within its time-frame and quest for the 'emblematic'. It was, therefore, excluded by these avowedly 'European' practices. Yet, it was just such problematic heritage that continued to matter to local people and that was more likely to disrupt wider Europeanising aims.

The ethnographic cases discussed in this section show that discourses of cosmopolitanism, attempts to reduce national affinities and to institutionalise Europeanisation, have been underway in the post-war Balkans, mobilised variously by international organisations and local people. What they also, show, however, is that these are more contested and complex in practice than the cosmo-optimistic arguments presume. In particular, what we have seen here is that what might superficially appear to be evidence of cosmopolitanism might entail paradoxical 'othering' or what Jansen calls 'closures'; and that international or Europeanising projects may risk evading, glossing over or even potentially aggravating the kinds of social divisions and sentiments that are viewed as problematic within the cosmopolitan position. In some instances they contribute to strengthening nationalistic sentiments and creating exclusions – such as Muslim heritage – that may threaten a cosmo-optimistic outcome in the future.

★★★

In highlighting some of the ways in which the cosmopolitan memory thesis does not operate in practice, my aim is neither to debunk the thesis nor to merely claim that practice is messy. The thesis is a powerful one that captures significant developments that are underway, especially, though not only, in relation to Holocaust commemoration. But there are other processes at work too, as the examples variously show. These include continuing processes of othering and of bounding, in which the nation remains an active agency. At the same time, however, 'the nation' is not a static entity but is itself being reconfigured – including within new forms of commemoration and heritage themselves.

Within Europe and to a large extent beyond it too, the Holocaust has become part of what we might call a 'cosmopolitan curriculum'. Knowing about it, and increasingly visiting some of its associated heritage – in Europe or outside it – has become a cosmopolitan credential. Levy and Sznaider have more recently expressed this in terms of the development of a *memory imperative,* especially in relation to human rights (2010). In research that I conducted in Nuremberg, with visitors to the former Nazi party rally grounds, many expressed their reasons for coming as a kind of moral duty – 'it's something we felt that we should do'.[37] I referred to this form of visiting as 'moral witnessing' and suggested that it entailed putting oneself in a place – a position – from which to be able to speak not only directly about the particular site and its history but wider historical matters too. My interviewees came from many countries – Australia, Britain, Canada, France, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland and the US as well as Germany – and most invoked their own country or nationality at some point during the interview, often to talk of how some aspect of uncomfortable history was dealt with (or not) there and sometimes to try to explain to me how I should understand their position. Talk of Germany and Germans was common to almost all interviews. Yet, although my interviewees often framed their comments in terms of nation-states and usually took for granted that these were the active agencies in creating public history, many also, simultaneously, engaged in trying to think in terms of the position of others – e.g. what must it be like to be German – and to more generally make comparisons between different ways of representing the difficult past. In other words, what different national – and also more localised – self-positioning offered was not a constraint to cosmopolitan thinking but a vantage point from which to think about others and their ways of seeing and being in the world. The outcome of this was not a form of cosmopolitanism that relied on an uncritical sense of sameness and sharing; rather, it was one that can be characterised in terms of 'relationalities of openness across differences' of the kind noted earlier in this chapter (Glick-Schiller *et al.* 2011: 410, 403). Visitors did make judgements of relatively good and bad approaches, and they sometimes judged their own countries or those of others unfavourably. Theirs was, then, a *critical cosmopolitanism* that in some ways relied upon national variation for its operation, while not being tied to it in its realisation.

Although nations were an accepted part of this discourse and although the ethnographic research discussed in this chapter clearly shows their continued significance both as frames of action and as affectively significant for their citizens, the chapter has also shown, like the previous one, that it has become more difficult to 'do nationness' in quite the ways in which it was formerly done. At the very least, gestures to alternative narratives and heritages, and to other kinds of moral legitimacy, need to be made – and perhaps harnessed to a reconfigured way of being national. This, I suggest, is something that Holocaust commemoration often – though not always, as Feldman's example shows so well – helps achieve. What we have mostly seen in the cases above, however, is not so much the nation being *displaced* or 'cracked' by cosmopolitan memory as the nation presenting itself as cosmopolitan through harnessing more widely shared pasts as part of its own. That cosmopolitanisation – of memory or society – does not necessarily require a breaking or superseding of the nation is also shown by examples such as the UK's inauguration of a Holocaust Memorial Day as part of a pan-European project. Even in the case of Austria, which Matti Bunzl presents as one in which the nation is being superseded by Europe, the fact that the ultra-nationalist and anti-European Freedom Party is making precisely the same accommodation of Jews that he sees as a New European development, suggests that it is also fully appropriable to service the nation and even nationalism.

What has emerged here, then, is a dynamic of potentially cosmopolitan developments that are sometimes appropriated to other ends or bump up against limits and other agendas in practice. Nevertheless, cutting across all of the many debates about the late twentieth-century heritage and history preoccupation – and indeed situating those debates themselves – is a casting of the past as a focus through which to debate moral and political concerns. In other words, it has become a moral forum, perhaps even the pre-eminent moral forum of our times. While the past may to some extent have long played something of this role, a more widespread public acknowledgement of differences among historians, historical revisionism, debates about school curricula, identity politics, public controversies over matters such as commemoration, and the spreading of a conception of history as potentially regressive rather than progressive (Wright 1985), have all contributed to history being publicly debatable, and to its centring as a site for political and ethical contemplation today.[38]